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REGULATION OF NUCLEAR WASTE AND REACTOR
SAFETY WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF




The break up of the former Soviet Union has allowed public light
to be shed on an international disaster: indiscriminate nuclear waste
disposal. According to Russia's environmental minister Viktor
Danilov-Daniliyan, nuclear waste and accidents have caused large
parts of Russia to be "uninhabitable."' Russian scientists have classi-
fied fifteen percent of Russia as "ecologically unsafe" for humans.2
The waste is the legacy of an era when the interests of the state were
not restrained by environmental regulation, and is now the problem of
fledgling republics which lack the economic resources or technology
to contain it.3
Does an environmental cleanup problem mean curtailment of nu-
clear reactor operations in the former Soviet states? Presently, there
are forty-four operating commercial power nuclear reactors in Russia,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, with a total of sixty-eight reactors slated for
operation.4 While there has been public pressure to increase the
safety of, or shut down the Chernobyl-style reactors, the Common-
* Juris Doctor anticipated in 1995 from Chicago-Kent College of Law; Principal Instruc-
tor, Senior Reactor Operator at Commonwealth Edison Co. The author wishes to thank Chi-
cago-Kent Professor Fred Bosselman, Chris Tracy, and Gordon Craigo for guidance in preparing
this note.
1. Steve Raymer, Nuclear Pollution Plagues Former Soviet Union; Environment: A Map
Marking Non-Military Explosions Shows Scope of "National Disaster," L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1992, at A30.
2. David Hearst, Portrait Revealed of a Russia that is Killing Itself, GUARDIAN, Oct. 8,
1992, Home Page, at 20.
3. Yeltsin Will Probably Attend Rio Earth Summit, Reuters, Apr. 23, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
4. Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia would add another three operating reactors
to this list, with a total of nine reactors scheduled for operation in those countries. International
Datafile: Nuclear Power Status Around the World, IAEA BULL., Dec. 1993, at 60. Russia contin-
ues operation of VVER-style, or pressurized water reactors, RBMK-style, or light-water cooled,
graphite moderated reactors, as well as some liquid metal fast-breeder reactors. Ukraine has
three potentially operable RBMK-style reactors on the Chernobyl site, two which it continues to
operate, and several VVER reactors. Kazakhstan has a liquid metal fast-breeder reactor, and
plans for other reactors that will be discussed below. In addition, Lithuania's two operating
graphite moderated reactors are from the latest RBMK generation, with the highest commercial
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wealth of Independent States ("CIS") has a nuclear program that will
continue well into the future.5 Kazakhstan's Ministry of Science an-
nounced their intention to build six nuclear power units, beginning in
1993, to meet the electrical energy needs of that republic.
6
The significant nuclear waste problem in the former Soviet states,
along with an active, on-going nuclear power program in what are
now struggling independent republics prompts several questions, but
the one of concern here is: what is the state of the law to safely and
effectively govern nuclear waste and reactor safety? The Russian Fed-
eration in a declaration issued February 20, 1992 restructured the
State Committee for Nuclear and Radiological Safety
("Gosatomnadzor"), giving the following organizational details:
The preamble lays down the principles to be observed by those
responsible for the applications of nuclear energy: to establish effi-
cient safety arrangements to ensure the protection of citizens, soci-
ety and the State against the hazards of nuclear energy and ionizing
radiation.
The Gosatomnadzor will be responsible for preparing national
legislation governing the production and use of nuclear energy and
materials and radioactive substances. It will be up to the
Gosatomnadzor to organise and implement, at the national level,
the regulation and control of nuclear activities both for peaceful and
for military purposes. It will define the safety principles and crite-
ria, standards and rules as well as other regulatory measures, in par-
ticular, by establishing a licensing system for such activities as well
as an inspection system ....
Finally, the Declaration refers to the centralised system for the
development and safety of the nuclear industry and nuclear applica-
tions which existed in the previous Soviet Union. It specifies that,
given the present situation in the nuclear energy field and its possi-
ble adverse effects from the safety viewpoint, the Gosatomnadzor is
prepared to cooperate with the bodies responsible for regulation
and control of nuclear activities in the other States in order to estab-
capacity (net MWe) in the world. World List of Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR NEWS, Mar.
1993, at 41-58.
5. Janet Guttsman, Russia Economy Needs Nuclear Power, Like It or Not, Reuters, Apr. 3,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. The Soviet Union has been divided into the
following republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan;
although Estonia, Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania were not party to the Alma Ata Treaty creating
the CIS. Molly W. Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Role for Constitutional Law in Soviet Disu-
nion, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 41, 42 n.3 (1994). On near and long-term plans for nuclear power in
the CIS, see William C. Potter, The Future of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Safety in the Former
Soviet Union, NUCLEAR NEWS, Mar. 1993, at 61. See also Russia: More Detail on Effort to
Resume Construction, NUCLEAR NEWS, Mar. 1993, at 78, 78-79 (where one new VVER reactor
was scheduled to come on-line in 1993, and two additional reactors by 1995).
6. S. Martynov, Atom, Moscow NEWS, Sept. 30, 1992, at 40.
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lish a common policy for safe production and use of nuclear energy,
nuclear materials and radioactive substances. 7
The Russian offer to share resources comes at a time when each
of the Independent States is responsible for regulating nuclear facili-
ties within their borders.8 Ukraine has initially adopted reactor safety
rules similar to those in Russia.9 Those republics without operating
nuclear facilities are considering nuclear waste regulations, along with
other environmental regulations.
This Note will focus on whether a centralized regulatory author-
ity can provide effective oversight of reactor safety and cleanup of
nuclear waste in the former Soviet Republics. The model developed
here is structured around a central authority with certain powers re-
tained by states.
For comparison, and in order to aid in the development of the
regulatory model, the European Community ("EC") legislation for
nuclear waste control will be reviewed in Part II of this Note. In the
EC, truly autonomous states, similar to the CIS, attempt to act in con-
cert for certain types of legislation. The balance between centralized
control and state sovereignty will be considered, comparing state
rights and EC authority.
Part III of this Note will review the relevant oversight assistance,
authority, and treaties available from the international community.
The goal of this Note is to provide a success path for dealing with the
radioactive waste problems and reactor safety questions by noting the
advantages a central authority may offer. This is also an opportunity
to review practices and regulations that have been successful in other
international settings. Essential for a viable solution is to consider the
logistics of implementation: will the republics allow a centralized sys-
tem to work? Are the republics willing to sacrifice their sovereignty
to the degree necessary to assure safe reactor operation or contain-
ment and cleanup of nuclear waste?
In Part IV, the extent of the problems and the present legislative
conditions of the CIS are described to assure any proposed solution
7. Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Russian Federa-
tion, NUCLEAR L. BULL., June 1992, at 59, 59-60 [hereinafter Russian Federation].
8. Thus far, Lithuania has been the only country to allow Russia to help assure safety at a
reactor plant. In autumn of 1991, the plant staff was 97% Russian nationals, and although a
Lithuanian was symbolically appointed as plant manager, the operations staff relied on Minatom
to manage plant operations. Potter, supra note 5, at 62.
9. Geneive Abdo, Russia Tightens Safety Rules at Atom Plants, Reuters, Mar. 4, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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will address the needs of the new nation-states. Part V then presents
components of model solutions.
I. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. Structural Overview
Twelve sovereign states make up the EC (formerly the European
Economic Community), which was formed by the Treaty of Rome. 10
The original objective of the community was to create an open com-
mercial market for goods, services and capital." This goal was broad-
ened by the passage of the Single European Act ("SEA"), which came
into force in 1987, creating a market free from internal barriers among
EC members.
12
The EC is comprised of four institutions (and supporting consul-
tants): (1) the state-appointed Council of Ministers, (2) the Parlia-
ment, (3) the Commission, and (4) the Court.13 The Parliament passes
advisory legislation recommended by member states and sub-organi-
zations within the EC itself, but there is no executive branch to imple-
ment policy recommendations.' 4 Thus, the legislative and judicial
arms, along with the EC states, are left to create and implement EC
legislation. The Commission drafts legislation that is approved by the
Council. The states then use this legislation to draft or modify na-
tional laws in order to comply with the EC rule.15 Through this local
adoption, EC legislation is the catalyst for substantive change in the
legal systems of other sovereign nations.
10. Daniel Suman, Comment, Regulation of Ocean Dumping by the European Economic
Community, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 559, 573 n.86 (1991) (discussing the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] and the Barcelona Convention, EEC
TREATY art. 228(2)). The present members of the EC include Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. Id. at 573 n.85. In a broad sense, the EC can actually be thought of as bringing
together parties of the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom (discussed below) and
the EEC. See NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 39-42 (1991).
11. Suman, supra note 10, at 573.
12. Linda Maher, The Patent Environment: Domestic and European Community
Frameworks for Biotechnology, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 67, 101-02 (1992). Note that between the
creation of the EC and the SEA, the European Communities Act of 1972 established the foun-
dation for EC rule over sovereign nations by providing a "primacy of community laws over
domestic law, while" states remain members. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
COMPARATIVE LAW 24 (1989).
13. Maher, supra note 12, at 102. For an explanation on the interrelationship of these bod-
ies, see FRANCIS JACOBS ET AL., THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 258-61 (1990); CHRISTOPH SASSE
ET AL., DECISION MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1977).
14. Maher, supra note 12, at 102.
15. Id.
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The Court acts as the judicial system to sort out differences be-
tween members, with the question of legal standing based on either
EC membership or specific legislation passed by the EC.16 Sources of
EC law include regulations, directives and rulings from the European
Court of Justice ("EC Court"). The state courts have the responsibil-
ity to review state incorporation, implementation, and enforcement of
EC environmental directives.
17
Regulations are to be applied, by EC and state courts, generally
to states, and are binding directly on any state which the regulation
addresses.' 8 Directives are binding as to results on member states
with the methods of meeting them left to the states.19 State courts
may not have to adopt an EC directive under four exceptional circum-
stances: (1) if the legislation has not been adopted by the member
states, (2) if the state's directive does not conform to the EC directive,
(3) where a member state has exceeded its authority in applying a
directive, or (4) if the state law is unclear as to whether it is consistent
with a directive.20
B. Overview of Euratom and Reactor Safety Initiatives
In the areas of nuclear safety and waste handling, both the pres-
ence and absence of directives is noteworthy. The EC created the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom") to make
recommendations to ensure that basic health and safety standards of
member states are met (creating the "nuclear common market"). 2
1
The Euratom Treaty establishes standards for joint research, promotes
information exchange between member countries, is a source for li-
censing requirements and limits on information exchange, and sets
standards for radiation safety for both the general public and occupa-
16. Article 173(2) of the EEC TREATY only permits third-party standing where there is a
"direct and individual concern" to that party. For an extensive treatment of the structure, for-
mation, and function of the EC Court, see David Stoelting, The Jurisdictional Framework of the
European Court of Justice, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193 (1991).
17. ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY:
LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 159 (1988). A
member state or the commission may challenge the conformity of a state's environmental pro-
tection regulations to the EEC TREATY provisions under articles 30, 34, and 36, and a private
party may challenge state action, as in violations of articles 30 or 36 in a national court. Id. at
175.
18. Stoelting, supra note 16, at 193 (citing EEC TREATY art. 189).
19. REHOINDER & STEWART, supra note 17, at 157-58 (citing EEC TREATY art. 189(3)).
20. Id. at 159. For more extensive treatment of directives for environmental law, see LUD-
WIG KRAMER, Focus ON EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 156-78 (1992).
21. JAN WERTS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 13 (1992).
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tional radiation workers.22 Additional mandates included creation of
an agency to track nuclear materials, coordinate suppliers, and limit
delivery as provided by law, along with mining requirements and safe-
guards direction for EC members.
23
Euratom legislation in force was designed to promote the safe use
of nuclear power and to prevent the misuse of nuclear materials, but
Euratom has little authority on which to base community decisions
relating to health and the environment, as very little in these areas is
agreed upon by the entire community, and is subsequently ratified.24
If a member of the community discharges nuclear waste that does not
comply to Euratom standards, however, the affected party may initi-
ate proceedings in the EC Court.25
Initially, Euratom activities surrounding the safety design basis
for plants was limited to consultation among members. 26 After sev-
eral proposals, the present state of the law requires community con-
sultation only before establishment or expansion of nuclear power
plants.27 A Euratom standard which was not adopted, however, was
that Euratom be allowed to have consultants render an opinion on
nuclear projects in member states.28 France did not ratify this propo-
sal, fearing that siting criteria adopted by the consulting group would
22. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM
TREATY] arts. 1-39. The basic safety standards were revised in 1980 (per Directive 80/836/
Euratom), and are now under review for revision based on a new study from the International
Commission on Radiation Protection, recognizing a lower threshold of potential harm from ion-
izing radiation. Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for Economic Co-operation and Dev., European
Communities: Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Basic Safety Standards for Radia-
tion Protection, NUCLEAR L. BULL., Dec. 1993, at 74, 74-75.
23. EURATOM TREATY, supra note 22, arts. 52-91.
24. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 17, at 98.
25. Id. at 98-99 (citing Council Resolution of 22 July 1975 on the Technological Problems of
Nuclear Safety, 1975 O.J. (C 185) 1). Infringement proceedings are initiated pursuant to EEC
TREATY art. 169, or a member state can ask that another member's regulations receive a review
under articles 30 and 36. Normally, on-going violations are first pursued by reporting the violat-
ing member to the Commission, and requesting the Commission issue an article 169 letter
against the offending state. The Commission will draft the letter as an Opinion, requiring com-
pliance. The Court of Justice can then provide a specific ruling on the issue if compliance is not
forthcoming, or in the case of a single past violation. Maher, supra note 12, at 103. Although no
member has yet resorted to the EC Court of Justice for a ruling on a nuclear waste matter,
should the Court rule on such an issue, its ruling is binding under the EEC TREATY art. 189.
Stoelting, supra note 16, at 194, 214.
26. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 17, at 99 (citing EURATOM TREATY, supra note 22,
art. 37).
27. Id. at 100 (citing to Commission Regulation 1056/72, 1972 J.O. (L 120) 7, amended by
Commission Regulation 1215/76, 1976 O.J. (L 140) 1). This is despite calls to harmonize the
safety requirements for all EC plants. Id. at 99.
28. Id. (citing 1977 O.J. (C 31) 3).
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be too restrictive, thus endangering its policy on energy independence
and thereby its competitiveness. 29
Euratom has adopted many regulations that coordinate and
standardize policies among the EC states, with graduated levels of ap-
proval that increase with the significance of the regulation. Euratom
has passed regulation-type initiatives, environmental quality stan-
dards, and directives to coordinate state policies; directives require
unanimous ratification before they are adopted in an enforceable
manner.
30
C. Nuclear Waste Storage
For radioactive waste, the starting point for the EC was initially
just consultation and information exchange among member states.
31
Euratom established goals to find effective radioactive waste process-
ing, storage and disposal methods. 32 Euratom is committed to
perfecting a handling and long-term storage method for irradiated nu-
clear fuel by identifying four projects open to Community joint activi-
ties: the German Asse salt mine, a pilot underground facility in
Belgium, and underground validation facilities in both France and the
United Kingdom. 33
29. Id. at 100. The ability of one country to reject legislation is the norm, rather than the
exception. This is based in law where the matter is one of a state's "vital interests." The remain-
ing, less vital, legislation also comes from unanimous decisions, rather than pure majority, by
Council agreement. SASSE ET AL., supra note 13, at 88.
30. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 17, at 138-40. Maher lists the four EC devices, by
type: Proposal, Regulation, Directive and Decision. Maher, supra note 12, at 102. A proposal is
the presentation for consideration of a regulation or directive, while a regulation, once adopted,
preempts national laws within the bounds of the regulation. Id. A directive is binding but only
sometimes enforceable in national courts. Id. A decision is binding on both a nation's courts
and the Court of Justice. Id.
31. REH3INDER & STEWART, supra note 17, at 100.
32. Council Decision 75/406, 1975 O.J. (L 178)(Euratom), 181 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 1001
(1978). This was another research and problem-definition document, without legislative de-
mands of the member states.
33. Council Decision 89/664, 1989 O.J. (L 395)(Euratom), 181 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 1051,
1052 (1990). These additional commitments also call for studies and describe solutions, without
creating mandates for the states. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 17, at 101. For all of their
interest in tracking waste and special nuclear materials, the EC has never codified a classification
system for radioactive waste, and the member states do not use the same system. G.D.
BURHOLT & A. MARTIN, THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF
RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 4 (1988). The
general classes that follow are based on the IAEA's classification of high-level waste, then call-
ing all other materials low-level waste.
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1. Low-Level Nuclear Waste
The only proposed radioactive waste directive relates to ocean
dumping. Ocean dumping of radioactive waste was permitted by the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.
34
By the 1980s, only the United Kingdom was continuing this practice
by dumping low-level radioactive waste in the North Sea, as permitted
by the London Convention.35 In 1985, the United Kingdom remained
a holdout in attempts to permanently restrict the ability of member
states to dump low-level radioactive waste, even though they would
agree to a year-by-year moratorium.
36
In 1992, the EC obtained a longer-term agreement from all its
members, even though two States insisted on language that allows
possible future resumption of ocean dumping.37 Although there is a
general prohibition on dumping waste at sea from Gibraltar to North-
ern Ireland (including low-level radioactive waste), both France and
the United Kingdom insisted on language allowing resumption follow-
ing a 15 year moratorium.38
2. High-Level Nuclear Waste
A variety of recommendations and cooperative studies have
come from the Commission.39 Working groups have been established
to address standards, practices and regulations, as well as improved
communications methods in the event of incidents.4° In the absence
of specific directives, member states rely on state laws and treaties.
D. Liability
Legislative provisions for third-party liability in the event of a nu-
clear accident have been created in all EC countries having a nuclear
power program. 41 All EC members are party to the Paris Convention
of 1960, as amended by the additional protocol of 1964, except for
34. Suman, supra note 10, at 596.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 596-97.
37. EC Ministers Reach Accord, Albeit Limited, on Protection of the North Sea, German
Information Center, Oct. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File.
38. Id.
39. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 17, at 100-01.
40. Id. at 101.
41. BURHOLT & MARTIN, supra note 33, at 9. For a review of civil liability in the EC, see
Linda M. Sheehan, The EEC's Proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by
Waste: Taking Over When Prevention Fails, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 405 (1991).
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Ireland and Luxembourg.42 Some countries are party to a separate
convention, the Vienna Convention, which was open for world
participation.
43
The problem with the variety of conventions is that an operator
who may be liable under one convention would not be liable under
another, or the operator may not be liable to harmed members of
countries who are not in accord on a single agreement.
A recently proposed EC Directive concerns civil liability for envi-
ronmental harm or waste-related injury." Based on the concepts of
(1) the polluter pays and (2) encouraging preventive action, the direc-
tive would impose a no-fault standard on the waste creator, but it in
turn could sue a third party for negligence if the release were the third
party's fault.45 This is the first legislation offered by the EC to place
liability for environmental damage. 46
Several steps led to the Civil Liability Directive. In 1975, the EC
passed a Council Directive on Waste, 47 a broad piece of legislation
similar to the initial Euratom Acts. For example, the Council Direc-
tive on Waste defers to the national law definitions of waste, including
42. 2 NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Nu-
CLEAR LEGISLATION: REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR AcTIvi-
TIES 207 (1984) [hereinafter 2 NUCLEAR LEGISLATION]. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany (FRG), Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom are party to the Paris Convention. Ireland and Luxembourg do not have
commercial nuclear power plants. Id. The method of implementation changes in different
states. As adopted in Germany, for example, the facility operator has unlimited liability in the
event of an accident and must carry insurance for claims up to 500 million DM; the operator is
further indemnified for claims up to 1000 million DM with the federal and state covering 75%
and 25% of the risk respectively. BURHOLT & MARTIN, supra note 33, at 55. Beyond a concern
for the welfare of its citizenry, because the state is partially indemnifying the operator, the state
has a vested interest in the safe operation of facilities within the state.
43. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability, opened for signature May 21, 1963, 2 I.L.M.
727. For an overview of the provisions of nuclear liability conventions, see Peter Riley, The
Legal Control of Nuclear Energy Between States, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 303 (1991).
44. BAKER & MCKENZIE, SINGLE EUR. MARKET REP. 15-11, July 1992 (citing Proposed
Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 89) 282; 1989
O.J. (L 251) 3 and 1991 O.J. (L 192) 6).
45. Id. Compare this with civil action under the German Liability for Environmental Dam-
ages Act which also applies a strict liability standard, but victims under this act only need to
prove probable cause, and requires the alleged tortfeasor to help the victim prepare her case.
Federal Republic of Germany: German Law and Government Structure, 241 INT'L ENVTL. REP.
0101, 0107 (1991). The presumption of causation is based on the type of installation: if the instal-
lation is capable of causing the harm, then it is presumed to be the cause. BAKER & MCKENZIE,
supra note 44, at 15-N14 to 15-NI5.
46. Id.
47. Sheehan, supra note 41, at 405 (citing Council Directive on Waste, 1975 O.J. (L 194) 39).
Deference to state law is typical of EC legislation in new areas of law. The following sections of
the EEC TREATY have also been referenced as the basis for environmental legislation in the EC:
the Preamble and arts. 2, 100, and 235.
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both hazardous and nonhazardous waste.48 This was followed in 1984
with regulations on hazardous waste shipments across state borders.
49
Finally, the call for the more specific and binding Civil Liability Direc-
tive followed a 1986 fire in a Swiss warehouse that caused chemical
contamination of the Rhine River, which spread to France, West Ger-
many and the Netherlands.50 Thus far, although more stringent nu-
clear directives have been called for in Parliament,51 the Council has
not been able to pass them.
E. Sovereignty
The individual states are the primary providers of specific regula-
tions for nuclear regulation and waste handling within those states,
and based on the overview of regulations thus far, the EC has only
stepped in to provide limited guidelines in matters such as safety for
both the public and workers. For this reason, interstate challenges by
individuals against operation of facilities apply state laws within an
EC framework, as is seen in the following two cases.
1. The Wackersdorf Decisions
One method originally planned for German high-level waste
management was reprocessing. 52 Wackersdorf, located about 130 ki-
lometers from the German-Austrian border, was a private operation
designed to perform this needed public service, as required by law
without harmful effects to the public.5 3 Initial legal steps toward es-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 406 n.7 (citing Council Directive on the Supervision and Control within the Euro-
pean Community of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste, 1984 O.J. (L 326) 31,
amended by Council Directive, 1986 O.J. (L 181) 13). This was caused by barrels of dioxin-
tainted waste vanishing from Italy, and appearing in a barn in San Quentin, France. Id.
50. Id.
51. REMINDER & STEWART, supra note 17, at 100 (discussing European Parliament Reso-
lutions 1980 OJ. (C 327) 15, 1977 O.J. (C 183) 1, and 1976 O.J. (C 28) 9).
52. Kurt Heller, Border Installations: The Experience of Wackersdorf, in NUCLEAR ENERGY
LAW AFTER CHERNOBYL 83, 83 (Peter Cameron et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the 1976 amend-
ment of § 9a of the German Atomic Energy Act). Fuel reprocessing is also an EC regulated
activity, specifically under EURATOM TREATY, supra note 22, art. 78. See discussion, supra notes
21-40 and accompanying text. EURATOM TREATY, supra note 22, art. 78 provides that "[tihe
Commission must approve the techniques to be used for the chemical processing of irradiated
materials" but this is for safeguards purposes. EURATOM TREATY, supra note 22, art. 34 requires
member states to get the Commission's permission to perform "dangerous experiments," but
reprocessing fuel applies known technology and it would be difficult to challenge a plant installa-
tion under that section. Thus, the EC requirements for this type of installation are limited to
monitoring releases, monitoring public and worker exposure, and tracking the location of all
special nuclear materials.
53. Heller, supra note 52, at 83. The cost-benefit dynamics of reprocessing spent fuel over
burial of waste include many factors, such as the market price of new fuel, the availability of
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tablishing the plant started in 1979, and in 1984, after public hearings,
the Bavarian State government provided a site license for plant con-
struction. 54 Federal administrative rules spurring site development
were provided in 1985 and 1986 to meet the goals of nondependence
on other nations for waste management, to avoid final storage of fuel
as waste, and to quickly bring into service a plant which could accom-
plish these goals without harmful side effects.
55
Legal action was initiated in both Germany and Austria to try to
block plant completion. Litigation in Bavarian Administrative Court
resulted in a partial revocation of the Partial Construction Permit, re-
stricted only to those parts of construction which did not require a
license under the atomic energy laws (saying, in essence, the state au-
thority had unlawfully licensed more than it was required to under the
permit).
56
Meanwhile, the German Court held that foreign authorities were
not bound by decisions in Germany (applying the public international
law principle of territoriality). Also, where a foreigner brings action
in a foreign court, even where that person has standing, for removal of
a licensed facility in Germany, such judgment is unenforceable as a
violation of German public policy.5
7
Additional legal roadblocks for Wackersdorf operation, brought
by an Austrian farmer, were dismissed by Austrian courts.5 8 The Aus-
trian farmer brought two causes of action before Austrian courts to try
to halt construction of Wackersdorf: the first based on wrongful inter-
ference with possession, and the second on the right to protection
from harmful discharges.5 9 Note that Germany recognized the right
reprocessing facilities, and the availability of disposal sites for high-level waste and process by-
products. As part of a high-level waste reduction plan, reprocessing fuel has been part of Ger-
many's five step high-level waste management plan. THIRD REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS
AND THE U.S. SECRETARY OF ENERGY FROM THE NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW
BOARD, May, 1991, at D-7 [hereinafter NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD].
54. Heller, supra note 52, at 85. The Partial Construction License was issued in accordance
with Section 7 of the Atomic Energy Act. Id.
55. Id.; see also NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD, supra note 53.
56. Heller, supra note 52, at 86. For an overview of the licensing process in the Federal
Republic of Germany, see NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., LICENSING SYSTEMS AND INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS 44-51 (1986).
57. Heller, supra note 52, at 88.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 90 (claim for interference brought under § 340 of the Austrian Civil Code, and
claim for protection brought under §§ 364 and 364a). Section 364 provides that an owner may
prevent harmful discharges onto his property when he does not encroach on the rights of a third
party, and when he does not interfere with the furtherance of the public welfare. Section 364a
limits this, however, when the discharge comes from a duly licensed installation, in which case
the owner can only get compensatory damages if a harmful discharge occurs. Id.
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
of foreign nationals to participate in the public licensing proceedings
of a site within its borders.60
The political climate of Germany's neighbor certainly was not
pro-nuclear as Austria banned completion of a nuclear power plant,
which had started construction in 1971, by public referendum in
1978.61 Nevertheless, the Austrian courts decided against the
farmer.62 Despite the plant being built in a neighboring country, both
courts felt competent to hear the case, although an appellate court
reviewing one of the cases felt any attempt to enforce an adverse judg-
ment against the facility would be contrary to public policy.63 The
appellate court did not rule on whether, at a distance of 150 kilome-
ters, the farmer was a neighbor of the facility entitled to protection.
64
2. The Oldenburg Decision
Here, the issue was whether a resident of the Netherlands, resid-
ing twenty-five kilometers from the proposed site of a German nu-
clear power plant, has rights that are affected by a license issued
within Germany. 65 The lower court held that "extending the effects of
the license to legal positions in the territories of foreign States would
be an infringement of public international law rules."'66 The Federal
Administrative Court canceled the Oldenburg Decision, and provided
a new procedure to be followed. 67 It did not base the decision on
whether a resident residing near a border was not substantially de-
fined as an international citizen, but rather held that the case required
application of the German Atomic Energy Act.
68
60. Id. at 88.
61. Id. at 86.
62. Id. at 91 (citing § 81 of the Austrian Code of Jurisdiction).
63. Id. at 91-92.
64. Id. at 95. Other neighbors were uneasy about the potentially long reach of the Austrian
courts-namely, that the courts could reach across sovereign borders to close facilities. See In
Brief; Czechoslovak Daily on Austrian Decisions on Nuclear Plants, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Apr. 22, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
65. Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Federal Republic of
Germany: Right of Residents of the European Economic Community to Bring an Action Against
a Nuclear License-Decision of the Federal Administrative Court, NUCLEAR L. BULL., Dec. 1987,
at 23, 23-24 [hereinafter Right of Action].
66. Id. at 23. This judgment had been contested on the grounds that a citizen living so near
the border had rights beyond those of other international citizens. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. See NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
NUCLEAR LEGISLATION: REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR Ac-
TIvrrEs 108 (1983) (describing licensing condition for nuclear power plants under § 7 of the
German Atomic Energy Act).
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Since the Atomic Energy Act has as its objectives the preserva-
tion of life, health and property against the risks of nuclear energy,
these objectives require interpretation of the Act in such a manner as
to assure that the international obligations of the Act are met.69 The
Court felt the protection offered by the Act should be offered no mat-
ter on which side of the border the affected person resided. 70 The
Court emphasized that residents of European Community States were
protected under the Act, as the legislative history indicated that Ger-
man membership in the European Atomic Energy Community played
a substantial part in the special relationship under which protection,
and a right of action, may be offered. 71
F. Significant EC Cooperative Achievements
It is worthy to note a few policy areas where European unity has
been achieved, the level of national cooperation with those common
policies, and to compare them with the Euratom experience. The
EC's Common Agricultural Policy has centered on trying to achieve a
singular approach to agricultural surpluses and to limit nationalistic
farm spending.72 After more than eighteen years of conflict and disa-
greement, that goal is coming close to being met.73 The most recent
breakdown in price supports received significant protest from French
farmers, providing another challenge as to whether maintenance of
the common market is to be held paramount.74
The EC Economic and Monetary Union is the cornerstone of
achieving a Europe "united in their essential interests. '75 The com-
mon European Monetary System ("EMS") was intended to enhance
monetary stability in Europe (both with exchange rates and inflation),
to improve coordination within the EC to create economic growth,
and to be a stabilizing force on world economic markets.76 Although
efforts in 1992 came close to achieving that goal, the United Kingdom
("UK") and Germany remain holdouts to achieving the last step of
69. Right of Action, supra note 65, at 23-24.
70. Id. at 24.
71. Id.
72. See WERTS, supra note 21, at 220-21. Art. 39 of the Treaty of Rome lists the underlying
purposes of the EC Common Agricultural Policy: ensuring a fair standard of living for the farm-
ing community, stabilizing markets, guaranteeing supplies at reasonable markets, and increasing
productivity through technology.
73. Id.
74. Alex Brummer & Mark Tran, US Digs Heels in Over Farm Trade, GUARDIAN, Sept. 28,
1993, Home Page, at 1.
75. WERTs, supra note 21, at 35.
76. Id. at 245-46.
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issuing a common EC monetary unit.77 The UK resisted EC priorities
for monetary policy while Germany, with its economic outlook com-
plicated by absorption of East Germany and higher than normal
growth (and interest) rate, refused to subjugate its economic goals in
favor of a supranational bank.
78
A common policy achievement within the EC was in marine pol-
lution.79 Another success was EC adoption of the Montreal Protocol
limits for the reduction of chlorofluorocarbons. 80 These are con-
trasted with a failure to achieve a Common Fisheries Policy because of
UK concerns about their market being flooded with cheap fish caught
off the Canadian coast, if the market were opened.81 Economic pro-
tection of state interests remains preeminent to attempts to achieve
common policies.
G. Conclusions about the EC
Where the EC has chosen to act, the autonomous states have vol-
untarily given up their right to sovereignty in significant, but limited
areas. The EC has created unified guidelines for public exposure, an
oversight inspection agency, and all EC members are parties to the
same liability convention in the event of an accident. Thus EC mem-
bers have taken initial steps to protect the public, and have bound
themselves to a uniform convention on liability.
8 2
In striking a balance between central supranational control and
state sovereignty, the scale still tips in favor of the latter for two rea-
sons. First, no legislation is passed with a mere majority consent, by
law or convention. It takes a unanimous vote to subrogate EC inter-
ests for state interests. Second, if a state can call an interest a "vital
state" interest, the state maintains legal supremacy over the EC.
77. Robert Kuttner, Why Europe Didn't Take the Last Step Toward Union, Bus. WK., Aug.
23, 1993, at 10.
78. Id.
79. WERTS, supra note 21, at 262. The EC concern, spurred by the grounding of the Amoco
Cadiz, was primarily with off-coast oil spills, and the EC agreed in spirit to prevent and combat
such spills and to promote standards to support these goals within international bodies. Id.
80. Markus Jachtenfuchs, The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
28 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 261, 261 (1990).
81. WERTS, supra note 21, at 260-61.
82. See, e.g., Commission Statement on German Unification, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES,
Supp. 4/90, at 99 (1990). As part of German unification (Federal Republic of Germany or West
Germany and the German Democratic Republic or GDR), Germany is in the unique position of
having applied its regulatory structure, following unification, to former Eastern bloc facilities.
Unification treaties initially called for compliance with European Community Standards for ra-
diation protection, by either upgrading installations or closing those facilities which could not be
brought into compliance. The GDR had to immediately comply with EURATOM TREATY arts.
33, 35, 36, and 37 at the time of unification, and reveal all material problems at their plants. Id.
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Although calls have been made to change from this present political
reality for the common good of the EC, the States limit relinquish-
ment of sovereign control of interests they maintain are vital, which
others could opine are not.8 3 The biggest resistance to centralized
control comes, not surprisingly, where national economic interests are
at stake.
Even though Euratom's powers (EC's supranational authority for
nuclear issues) are limited, the existence of such a coalition may have
a greater impact. There is mutual respect among states shown in state
decisions that acknowledge both the sovereignty of sister-states and a
willingness to assure that common interests of the community are not
blocked by state lines. This mutual respect comes from the recogni-
tion that states are operating as part of a community. So even where
power is not given up to a supranational authority, the existence of the
authority and the community helps establish a basis for cooperation
and a sense of obligation among participating nations.
EC commitments also show how a normative carryover can occur
because states have jointly chosen a course of action. For example,
within the agreements reached for the EMS, none designated or cre-
ated a central bank, yet the FRG Bundesbank has acted as a lender of
last resort.84 Here, a state took an action jointly that it would not
have taken unilaterally, for the sake of stable exchange rates (which
creates a stable, predictable industrial market in Europe).8 5 A state
can also take action in support of a joint obligation that would other-
wise be too domestically unpopular to perform.86 That is because
States will try to act consistently, in their domestic affairs and in their
conduct generally, with the international commitments they make.
II. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
A. Assistance Agencies for Nuclear Operations or Waste Cleanup
8 7
Agencies and treaties from the international community de-
scribed here will be used in the model developed in Part V. Groups
83. SASSE ET AL., supra note 13, at 264-66.
84. John Baker & Martin Kolinsky, The State and Integration, in THE CONDITION OF STATES
116 (Cornelia Navari ed., 1991). Germany, with its strong Deutschmark, can stabilize currency
in weaker economies, like that of Italy, with a positive carry-over effect throughout Europe. Id.
85. Id.
86. This is the technique of criticism diffusion by blaming the joint pact for voluntary state
action. Id.
87. The agencies and organizations singled out here are the tip of the assistance iceberg.
Obvious omissions from the discussion below include CERN, the European research arm, the
British Nuclear Structures research group, and INPO, the U.S. Institute of Nuclear Operations,
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which realistically would be adopted or used in a non-adversarial
manner by the CIS are included, but this list is not meant to exclude
any others which could help improve the margin of safety of reactor
operations, or cleanup radioactive waste. Although many other
groups can act in an oversight or compliance-assurance capacity, the
true solution to these problems requires maximum cooperation
among the parties to the agreements.
Several international agencies provide guidance and technical
assistance to assure safe operation of nuclear power plants as well as
to assure the safety and health of the world's population. Some of
these are divisions of the United Nations, such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") and the World Health Organiza-
tion ("WHO"), that have acted in the past along with other UN
groups such as the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation ("UNSCEAR").
Additional non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") have
been important contributors during the post-Chemobyl assessment
and assistance efforts in the CIS.88 These include the World Associa-
tion of Nuclear Operators ("WANO"), the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency
("OECD/NEA"), and the International Commission on Radiological
Protection ("ICRP").
The IAEA was formed by the UN General Assembly in 1957. Its
charter seeks to assure that atomic energy contributes to world peace,
health, and prosperity, and to provide assistance, so long as no mili-
tary application is made from its assistance.89 The IAEA helps devel-
oping countries with their nuclear power programs, providing
all of which provided aid and advice to the former Soviet Union following Chernobyl, as well as
a variety of government agencies from countries worldwide. Those groups included here are
examples of international assistance to the CIS and are not intended to reflect the limits of
potential sources of assistance.
88. For a thorough discussion of the significant role NGOs play in creating change in inter-
national laws, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Develop-
ment of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI.-KENrr L. REV. 61 (1992). The significant
omissions from the NGOs suggested here include Greenpeace, the Green Party, and other envi-
ronmental activist groups. Their omission does not mean they are not part of the solution, as, on
the contrary, part of the credit for the major political change creating the CIS has been pressure
from these groups. See Potter, supra note 5, at 61. However, these groups are not part of the
coalition that would be called on to implement the changes suggested here, as these groups
desire an end to the nuclear program in the CIS. Id.
89. 1 THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1992, at 61 (1992) [hereinafter YEAR BOOK]. The
IAEA Statute was passed in 1956 and came into force July, 29, 1957. 20 YEARS INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: 1957-1977, at 5 (1978).
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technical assistance, site assessment visits, and radioactive waste man-
agement advice. 9°
The IAEA provides a significant contribution toward nuclear
safety by maintaining an incident reporting system, to assure that
neighboring countries receive timely reports of incidents, which fall
into distinct reporting levels with over 60 significant criteria. 91 The
IAEA is also charged with maintaining international safeguards for
nuclear operations.92 This includes making site inspections to signato-
ries of international agreements related to safeguards, and other in-
spections as required by the U.N. General Assembly.
93
Despite the IAEA's mission, and the assistance it has already
provided following Chernobyl, Ukraine's Minister for Environmental
Protection does not believe enough has been done.94 He believes the
IAEA has taken the position of "disinterested observers or [they]
even oppose attempts to heal the nuclear wound on the body of our
country."95 Thus the IAEA is not perceived by all interested officials
as supporting the goal of waste cleanup.
The WHO has as its goal the attainment of the highest health
levels for all the world's people.96 In their United Nations public
health monitoring and advisory role, the WHO is worried about envi-
ronmental pollution, including radioactive waste.97 The WHO's
objectives include tracking radioactive exposure for radiation workers
and the public at large. 98 They also make recommendations for the
90. YEAR BOOK, supra note 89, at 61.
91. Id. at 61-62. By standardizing reporting criteria, neighboring countries can better ap-
preciate the level of emergency created by a reactor accident, and know whether it is necessary
to shelter or evacuate their people.
92. Id. at 62.
93. Id. North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), and
had therefore authorized IAEA inspections to assure nuclear material is not used for other than
peaceful purposes. North Koreans denied IAEA members access to their site at Yongbyon,
claiming it could not be inspected as it was not on the IAEA's published list of plants to be
inspected, and also claimed it was a military base rather than a nuclear installation. North Korea:
IAEA Not Allowed to See Suspected Nuclear Site, NUCLEAR NEWS, Mar. 1993, at 77-78. The
IAEA also performed safeguards inspections in Iraq, and found Iraq had violated provisions of
the U.N. Security Council's mandates for information on weapons of mass destruction. YEAR
BOOK, supra note 89, at 62.
94. Yuriy Kostenko, Ten Tonnes of Radioactive Death, reprinted in Ukraine: Ukrainian Min-
ister on Chernobyl Project; Criticizes IAEA, BBC Monitoring Service, Aug. 6, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
95. Id. Kostenko also says the IAEA is of the opinion that Ukraine does not need assist-
ance to help it out of its ecological problems, and that they are merely trying to profiteer from
their plight.
96. YEAR BOOK, supra note 89, at 85.
97. Id. at 86.
98. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., NUCLEAR POWER: MANAGEMENT OF HIGH LEVEL RADIO-
ACTiVE WASTE 1 (1982). A recent WHO-sponsored study concluded no increase in leukemia
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long-term safe storage of radioactive waste materials, because of the
adverse health consequences associated with improper storage.99
UNSCEAR summarizes and evaluates reports made by U.N.
member states and agencies. 1°° UNSCEAR is based in Vienna and
holds annual conferences where scientists help to evaluate data from,
for example, the International Chernobyl Project. 101 UNSCEAR dis-
tinguishes itself from the IAEA, because while the IAEA's mandate
is to "promote peaceful use of nuclear energy," UNSCEAR's mission
is to study "the dangers."' 2
WANO is an industry group supported by member utility opera-
tors from around the globe. 0 3 Their projects include peer-review vis-
its, where experienced operators from sister plants can observe
practices, suggest improvements, and publicize good practices to other
operators.1l 4
OECD's activities can be traced to 1960, while OECD/NEA
started in 1972 as the European Nuclear Energy Agency, which has
expanded membership to include Australia, Canada, Japan and the
United States. 0 5 They are specifically interested in "furthering the
development of nuclear power as a safe, environmentally acceptable
and economic energy source."'1 6 OECD/NEA has cooperative agree-
ments to closely collaborate with the IAEA and Euratom because all
three groups have similar roots: nuclear weapons non-proliferation. 10 7
The ICRP is an international radiation standards setting
agency.' 08 Recommendations from the ICRP are the basis for the lat-
has been found as a result of Chernobyl seven years after the accident. Late News in Brief,
NUCLEAR NEWS, June 1993, at 22.
99. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 98, at 1.
100. William Branigin, Once Created, Agencies Refuse to Just Fade Away; Many Offices
Hanging on Despite Seeming Obsolescence, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1992, at A27.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. E. Michael Blake et al., Reviewing 50 Years of Nuclear History, NUCLEAR NEWS, Jan.
1993, at 56, 68.
104. Id. A recent report documents results of an exchange visit between nuclear plant oper-
ators from Georgia Power's Hatch Plant and Rosenergoatom's Smolensk Atomic Energy Sta-
tion. See Amy Sproles, The Hatch-Smolensk exchange, NUCLEAR NEWS, Mar. 1993, at 35.
105. Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Foreword, in Nu-
CLEAR L. BULL., June 1992, at i. Member states include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, with Yugoslavia having special member status. OECD came
into being in 1960 by the Paris Convention, which came into force September 30, 1961, creating
the OEEC European Nuclear Energy Agency. Id.
106. Id.
107. Riley, supra note 43, at 308.
108. NRPB Wants Radon Action Level Halved, NUCLEAR NEWS, Mar. 1990, at 56.
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est proposed revisions of EC radiation standards, which the Commis-
sion says reflect the "most advanced knowledge" on these issues.10 9
The ICRP has four standing committees, which include invited scien-
tific experts from around the world, and establishes work programs in
areas of international concerns. 110
B. International Treaties
1. 1AEA Notification and Assistance Treaties
Following Chernobyl, the IAEA went to work on the information
roadblocks that exacerbated the Chernobyl disaster. Lack of informa-
tion from the Soviet Union prevented other countries, and citizens
within the Soviet Union, from taking the appropriate rapid protective
action necessary to avoid the fallout downwind from the Chernobyl
plume."' Lack of openness about the accident delayed getting
needed resources to the site which could have aided in mitigating and
monitoring the effects of the accident. Finally, lack of standardized
reporting methods and criteria meant that a person in a different
country with an understanding of different nuclear technology, even
with notice of a significant nuclear event, would not understand the
severity of the accident."12
The first such agreement, Early Notification of a Nuclear Acci-
dent ("The Early Notification Agreement") required prompt notifica-
tion of other IAEA member states, and neighboring states where the
accident has or may result in a radioactive release." 3 The Early Noti-
fication Agreement then outlines the type of information the IAEA is
charged with providing to other states."14
109. EC Commission: Energy Plans for 1993, Europe Information Service, Jan. 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Energy Library, ALLNWS File.
110. New Chairman of ICRP Named, INSIDE N.R.C., Jan. 11, 1993, at 16.
111. See GRIGORIY MEDVEDEV, CHERNOBYL NOTEBOOK 31-54 (1989).
112. The Guidelines on Reportable Events were actually published in 1984. A. 0. ADEDE,
THE IAEA NOTIFICATION AND ASSISTANCE CONVENTIONS IN CASE OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
183 (1987). The post-Chernobyl conference was an opportunity to emphasize the use of stan-
dardized criteria for reporting events. These created a series of classification levels, such as in-
progress radiological releases, potential release, or no potential for release, so all member na-
tions hearing the report could take action appropriate to the severity of the event.
113. Id. This convention was adopted on September 26, 1986, and entered into force Octo-
ber 27, 1986, and 39 parties have ratified their consent to this treaty as of late 1992. A good
source for an overview of liabilities treaties is NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORG. FOR ECO-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THIRD PARTY LIABILITY (1990) [hereinafter THIRD PARTY
LIABILITY].
114. ADEDE, supra note 112, at 160-61. In addition, this is passed onto members, and rele-
vant organizations, so expectations are made clear to future potential senders and recipients as
to what information should be forthcoming.
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The Convention on Assistance in the Event of a Nuclear Acci-
dent or Radiological Emergency was designed to coordinate offers of
assistance and requests for aid, through the IAEA, to designated state
organizations. 115 In the event assistance is offered, the agreement
then standardizes considerations for the requestor and the offeror."
6
This assures that appropriate assistance, both quantity and expertise,
is provided to combat the type of accident which occurred.
2. Liability
The last revision of the Vienna Accord from the IAEA is the
latest attempt to reconcile different international treaties on third
party liability.117 One key element of this accord is the elimination of
proof of operator fault in order for a claimant to obtain a damage
award." 8 The other purpose of this accord was to assure that mem-
bers of different conventions were not isolating themselves, due to a
member of the original Vienna convention not having a treaty-based
cause of action for civil liability against a member of the Paris conven-
tion." 9 The Vienna Accord is awaiting ratification by several
members. 120
115. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emer-
gency, opened for signature Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1377 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1987). It
has been ratified by 34 parties. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY Ass'N, BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR SAFETY
520 (1990). It should be noted that 31 countries refused to be bonded by the dispute resolution
methods provided. Those countries are: Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussia Soviet Socialist Republic
(now Belarus), China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt,
France, German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany (now Germany),
Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, Monaco, Mongolia, Norway,
Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (now Ukraine),
United Arab Emirates, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States and Viet Nam. Id. at
521-43.
116. ADEDE, supra note 112, at 169-72. This includes whether the aid is cost-free, medical
aid versus equipment and personnel, and liability for loss or damage of equipment or personnel.
Id.
117. Accord on Nuclear Liability Comes into Force, Reuters, Apr. 27, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. The new treaty, the Vienna Protocol, brings the Vienna Con-
vention of 1963 into line with the Paris Convention of 1960. The Vienna Protocol was originally
adopted on September 2, 1988, and entered into force on April 27, 1992, after it was signed by
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY, supra note
113, at 17.
118. Accord on Nuclear Liability Comes into Force, supra note 117.
119. Nuclear: Civil Liability Protocol Enters into Force, Europe Information Service, May 8,
1992, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, ALLNWS File.
120. Accord on Nuclear Liability Comes into Force, supra note 117.
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3. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties Today
The latest post-START round of Non-Proliferation Agreements
with CIS members has centered on eliminating weapons of mass de-
struction. After Belarus agreed to rid itself of nuclear weapons, the
United States entered into a new Non-Proliferation Treaty with that
republic in late 1992.121 The implementing agreements for this treaty
include provisions for environmental restoration of the former weap-
ons handling facilities. 122 The U.S. Department of Defense is provid-
ing up to $25 million (U.S.) for "all material, training and services
provided pursuant to this agreement....
4. Funds from G-7
The G-7 have pledged funds for nuclear waste cleanup and has
expressed interest in improving reactor safety within the CIS.124 To
help coordinate assistance to the CIS from the G-7, the G-7 have
agreed to create an embassy-level organization.125 This coordinating
arm is to set up base in Moscow in late 1993.126
121. Agreement Concerning Emergency Response and the Prevention of Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Oct. 22, 1992, U.S.-Belarus, 32 I.L.M. 275. This was encourage-
ment for joining with the other weapons-holding states to rid themselves of nuclear arms, as
occurred in the Agreement of Alma Ata. State Commonwealth Born in Alma Ata, CURRENT
DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, CDSP File.
122. Agreement Concerning the Environmental Restoration of Former Strategic Rocket
Forces Facilities and Sites to Promote the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De-
struction, July 22, 1993, U.S.-Belarus, 32 I.L.M. 1688.
123. Id. at art. Ill. A variety of other pledges have been made as rewards for destruction of
the CIS nuclear arsenal. For example, U.S. aid to Kazakhstan was increased by $91 million
(U.S.) to a total of $396 million (U.S.) after President Nursultan promised to join the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Clinton Raises U.S. Aid to Kazakhs to $396 Million, Reuters, Feb. 14,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. President Clinton also offered $85 million
to help Kazakhstan dismantle their nuclear weapons. Id. Kazakhstan then signed an agreement
with the Japanese, where Japan committed to divide $100 million (U.S.) among the four nuclear
weapons-holding republics, to help them rid themselves of the weapons. Kazakhstan: Kazakh-
stan Signs Agreement with Japan on Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, BBC Monitoring Service,
March 12, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS-C Database. Ukraine has also joined the
weapons for cash program, having agreed to accept $235 million (U.S.) in U.S. aid to dismantle
their missiles and clean up the missile silos ($185 million), to convert some defense industry to
civilian use ($40 million) and for security and control for the nuclear weapons while they are in
Ukraine. Ukraine: U.S. Gives Ukraine $100 Million to Scrap Warheads, Reuter General News,
Mar. 21, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
124. Nuclear Aid to Eastern Europe Has Reached $375 Million, NUCLEAR NEws, Jan. 1993, at
91. G-7, or the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations, includes Canada, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States. The addition of Russia as a partial member
has caused the coining of the phrase, "G-7-plus-one." International Economics, Russia Given
Expanded Role with G-7 as Non-Member Political Participant, BNA Daily Report for Execu-
tives, June 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
125. G-7 to Set Up Russia Aid Office in Sept., JUI Press, Aug. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS,




C. Summary of International Community Assistance
Many agencies and many nations have started working hard to
resolve problems in the CIS each see as important. Interagency and
interstate coordination is in its infancy, despite the wide variety of re-
sources offered. International agencies and agreements exist that can
help guide safe reactor operation and waste cleanup, but they are not
self-implementing. Finally, most funds have gone to dismantle the nu-
clear weapons threat, with the greatest results achieved thus far in Be-
larus, but with some commitment from all four nuclear weapons-
holding nations to comply with weapons reduction plans.
III. STATE OF THE FORMER UNION
A. Nuclear Waste
The attitude toward the harmful potential for nuclear waste was
voiced by the director of the Energy Physics Institute, who said in
1984, "[tlhe waste from nuclear power engineering, which is poten-
tially very hazardous, is so compact that it can be stored at places iso-
lated from the external environment." 127 Actions, however, speak
louder than words. According to Andrei Zolotkov, a radiation safety
engineer of the Murmansk Shipping Company, ships continued to
dump reactor cores in the Arctic Ocean through 1991.128 One esti-
mate of resulting contamination levels exceeds one billion curies,
although Russians have only disclosed dumping 2.5 million curies of
radioactive material, including expended reactor cores, at sea.129
At a nuclear weapons complex in the Siberian steppes, the human
toll is more evident. 30 At a lake on the steppes' site, according to
American physicist Thomas Cochran, a discharge pipe is emitting ra-
127. A. Sakharov, Preface to MEDVEDEV, supra note 111, at 2.
128. Patrick E. Tyler, Soviets' Secret Nuclear Dumping Causes Worry for Arctic Waters, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 1992, at Al. The Russian government's Committee of Nuclear Waste Disposal at
Sea, formed in response to these claims, confirmed that 17 reactors from seacraft had been dis-
posed of in the Arctic. Ship Reactor Disposal in Arctic Confirmed, NUCLEAR NEWS, Mar. 1993,
at 79, 79.
129. Report Tallies Vessels, Waste Dumped in Arctic, NUCLEAR NEWS, Dec. 1993, at 62, 62;
William J. Broad, Russians Describe Extent of Dumping Nuclear Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1993, at Al; Paul Hoversten, Panel to Probe Nuclear Pollution of Arctic Ocean, USA TODAY,
Aug. 15, 1992, at 3A. A curie is a common unit of radioactivity, equalling 3.7 x 1012 disintegra-
tions per second. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.5 (1993).
130. Earl Lane & Daniel Sheehan, Russia's Chilling Secret: Radioactivity Takes Its Deadly
Toll near a Nuclear Arms Complex, NEWSDAY, Mar. 17, 1992, Discovery, at 57. The U.S. Federal
weapons production facilities are also known ecological and radiological disaster zones, which in
years past have been beyond the reach of laws applied to states and the public. The state of the
law was discussed in the American Bar Association's Nineteen Annual Conference on the Envi-
ronment. Mark C. Schroeder et al., Regulation of Nuclear Materials: Should National Defense
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diation levels high enough to be lethal if exposed for one hour. 131
Russian scientists estimate there are at least 500,000 tons of radioac-
tive solid waste buried around the site, and because burial registration
did not start until 1980, the location of specific burial sites is un-
known.132 Because of reported work practices on the weapons site-
dumping in streams supplying local villages-an estimated 437,000
people have received harmful doses of radiation from the site.
133
Over twenty-five tons of plutonium is still stored at the site, intended
for power and submarine propulsion reactors. 134 Also stored there
are 400 million cubic meters of liquid nuclear wastes containing an
estimated 600 million curies of radioactive materials. 135 The exten-
sively contaminated ground waters from this site feed three Siberian
rivers (the Iset, Irtysh and Ob) which drain into and will contaminate




From the 1960s through the 1980s, the Soviet Union reportedly
set off 126 nonmilitary nuclear explosions. 38 In the drive to maintain
superpower status, these explosions were created to serve a variety of
industrial purposes. Below-ground explosions were detonated for
seismic testing, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and to create subterra-
nean caverns for toxic waste storage. 139 Above-ground explosions
were set off as part of dam construction projects and open pit mining
of coal and diamonds. 40 A corporation was even reportedly set up
with its mission to contract with foreign governments who wished to
pay hard currency to have their dangerous wastes destroyed: the So-
and Other National Policies Override State Standards?, in FEDERAL VERSUS STATE ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS 6-13 (1991).
131. Lane & Sheehan, supra note 130, at 57.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Daniel Sneider, Baker Focuses On Atomic Waste in Visit to Urals, CHRISTIAN Scl. MONI-
TOR, Feb. 13, 1992, The World, at 1.
135. Id.; Hoversten, supra note 129.
136. Sneider, supra note 134, at 1.
137. EDITORS OF HARV. L. REV., TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 9
(1992) [hereinafter TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW]. This concept is so fun-
damental, however, it is difficult to attribute it to a single source.






viet government would be the willing provider of commercial nuclear
explosions.14
1
The explosions left extensive contamination from the by-products
of the nuclear chain reactions. Twenty-six explosions were set off
along the Volga River basin and at least seven in salt domes near the
Caspian Sea.142  Not only can river-borne waste be carried to the sea,
but over time the salt domes push lower layers of salt towards the
earth's (river's) surface, and with it the radioactive contamination
caused by the explosions.
4 3
C. Chernobyl
About fifty tons of fuel from the Chernobyl Unit 4 Reactor were
dispersed into the atmosphere when the reactor exploded. 144 An ad-
ditional seventy tons of fuel were deposited in the immediate area
surrounding the site. 45 About fifty tons of fuel remained in the vicin-
ity of the reactor itself, later to be enclosed in a concrete sarcopha-
gus. 14 6 Of the fifty million curies of long-lived radioactive fallout
141. Peter Zheutlin, Dangerous Deal, the Nuclear Entrepreneurs, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 3,
1991, at A15.
142. Steve Raymer, Nuclear Horrors in Russia, "'Peaceful" Bombs Leave Fatal Legacy, AT.
LANTA CONST., Jan. 31, 1992, at Al.
143. Clair Shipman, Former Soviet Union Pays Consequences of Nuclear Use, Cable News
Network, Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
144. MEDVEDEV, supra note 111, at 22. Some background is given here on the reactor and
the events leading to the explosion at Chernobyl Unit 4. The RBMK reactor core is 14 meters in
circumference by 7 meters high. Id. at 9. The reactor is housed in a warehouse-like structure,
with no sealed barrier other than the reactor itself between the fuel and the environment; con-
tainment is provided only around piping leaving and entering the reactor. The reactor is filled
with fuel bundles in isolated tubes surrounded by graphite. Id. at 9-10. Channels in the graphite
allow for insertion of neutron-absorbing control rods, which are inserted to shut down the nu-
clear chain reaction and withdrawn to increase the reactor's power. Id. at 10. A minimum
number of control rods must remain fully inserted at all times to assure the remaining rods can
adequately control the fuel in the reactor. Id. The neutron-absorbing control rods contain bo-
ron, but also have a graphite end-follower to displace water when the control rod is not fully
inserted. Id. at 16. Water channels pass through the core, removing the heat produced by the
reactor, and producing steam for the electricity-generating turbines. The presence of water also
helps to slow the nuclear chain reaction, by preventing some neutrons from reaching adjacent
fuel bundles. Should this water become overheated and form steam, the effect in this reactor
type is to increase the number of neutrons available for the nuclear chain reaction. An experi-
ment to check the affects of a loss of site power resulted in staging the initial conditions needed
for the accident. Id. at 9. To assure the experiment was not interrupted, safety systems were
overridden. Id. at 11. To meet a last minute change in grid-power needs, an excessive number of
control rods were withdrawn. Id. at 16. Then when the experiment was started, operators failed
to recognize they had created the conditions needed to form steam in the reactor water channels
when there were not enough control rods inserted to shut the reactor down. Id. at 19. Operators
tried to rapidly shut down the reactor and actually increased reactor power to accident levels
because of the rapid insertion of the graphite end-followers into the core. Id. at 20. The rapidly
increasing self-sustaining chain reaction lead to the explosion. Id. at 20-22.
145. Id. at 22.
146. Id. at 23; Mike Edwards, Chernobyl, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 1994, at 100, 104.
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released from the 1986 disaster, an estimated twenty million curies
were deposited in the Ukraine, Byelorussia (now Belarus) and west-
ern Russia. 147 About 76,000 square kilometers were contaminated
with cesium-137 to levels between one and five curies per square kilo-
meter, and 28,100 square kilometers were contaminated above five
curies per square kilometer, affecting some four million residents. 148
By 1991, Soviet authorities planned to have completed evacua-
tion of 189,000 residents from the zones most severely affected.' 49 It
took until 1990 for surveys to be performed to determine that evacua-
tion of 73,000 of these people was warranted. 50 Compulsory resettle-
ment only occurred where exposure levels may be above five
millisieverts. 151 The basic aim was for members of the general popula-
tion not to receive more than five millisieverts in 1991, and one mil-
lisievert per year thereafter, if permitted by economic and social
conditions. 52 In Russia, victims of the Chernobyl accident receive
300 rubles per month (about $3.50 (U.S.) as of June 1992), or one-
third the minimum monthly pay.153
147. MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR: HEALTH AND
NATURE UNDER SIEGE 12 (1992).
148. Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Extracts From an
Information Note on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant, Submitted by the Delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the July
1990 Session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, NUCLEAR L. BULL., Dec.
1990, at 92, 92 [hereinafter Economic and Social Consequences of Chernobyl].
149. Id. at 97.
150. Id. at 95, 97.
151. Millisievert ("mSv"), where 1 mSv = 100 mRem ("Rem" stands for Roentgen
Equivalent Man). Both Rem and Sv are expressions of dose equivalent, where an absorbed dose
of ionizing radiation is adjusted for its damaging impact on one gram of human tissue. F. WIL-
LIAM WALKER, ET AL., GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., CHART OF THE NUCLIDES 57 (13th ed. 1984).
The general public is limited in the U.S. to a total accident dose of less than 25 Rem, following
the passage of the plume in the Low Population Zone outside the affected plant. See 10 C.F.R.
§ 20.4 (1993); 10 C.F.R. § 100.11 (1993); 56 Fed. Reg. 23, 360 (1991); INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY, THE INTERNATIONAL CHERNOBYL PROJECT: ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGI-
CAL CONSEQUENCES AND EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES 19 (1991) [hereinafter IN-
TERNATIONAL CHERNOBYL PROJECT]. More specific radionuclide evacuation criteria included
Cesium-137 levels exceeding 40 Ci/km2 , where cesium contamination is between 15 and 40 Ci/
km 2, or strontium-90 levels above 3 Ci/km2, or plutonium 239 or 240 levels above 0.1 Ci/km 2.
Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for Economic Co-operation and Dev., General Legislation: Act on
Social Protection of Citizens Suffering Damage Due to the Chernobyl Disaster (1991), NUCLEAR
L. BULL., Dec. 1991, at 50, 51-52 [hereinafter Social Protection]; see also, Social Defence Law of
the People Affected by Chernobyl Catastrophe in the Republic of Belarus, Feb. 22, 1991. For
similar legislation in Ukraine, see UN CONFERENCE ON ENVT'L DEV., UKRAINE NATIONAL RE-
PORT 12 (1992) [hereinafter UKRAINE NATIONAL REPORT]; Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for
Economic Co-operation and Dev., Legislation on Protection of the Public After the Chernobyl
Accident (1991), NUCLEAR L. BULL., Dec. 1993, at 68.
152. Social Protection, supra note 151, at 51.
153. Russia to Increase Compensation to Chernobyl Victims, Reuters, June 18, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Although the official initial death toll was thirty-one, Ukrainian
officials have made unsubstantiated claims that between six and eight
thousand people died as a result of Chernobyl. 154 The Ukrainian gov-
ernment has stated they desire to close the remaining operating units
at the Chernobyl site in 1993.155 However, Ukraine had a shortfall in
electrical generating capacity and restarted two of the Chernobyl units
to survive the 1992-93 winter, and has since suspended their shutdown
commitment.
156
Sixteen RBMK (Chernobyl-style) reactors are located in Russia,
Lithuania and Ukraine.1 57 Although some safety improvements have
been made, the most significant step needed to reduce public risk in
the event of a reactor accident has yet to be taken: the building of
reactor containments.' 58 The new republics may have difficulty rais-
ing the tens of millions of dollars needed to erect containment struc-
tures that would meet western standards. 159
D. Reactor Safety
The IAEA sent a team of visiting experts to assess the condition
of a site containing four VVER-440 type reactors in Bulgaria. Their
assessment was summarized by finding the plants were "in very poor
condition, with a number of safety-relevant deficiencies.' 160 The same
mid-1970s Soviet-designed vintage plants are presently in use in other
Eastern European countries. 161 Although this reactor design is more
154. Ron Popeski, Chernobyl Staff Unhappy About Closure Plans, Reuters, Aug. 14, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. For a balanced view in light of
"Chernobylphobia," see INTERNATIONAL CHERNOBYL PROJECT, supra note 151. The IAEA and
WHO have found that the accident was not the source of wide-spread mortality for the popula-
tion at large, rather the psychological damage is the lasting predominant health effect. Id. at 9,
23.
155. Popeski, supra note 154; see also UKRAINE NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 151 at 39-40.
156. Ukraine to Restart Two Chernobyl Reactors, Reuters, Oct. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File. The deadline was made less certain when the Ukrainian parliament
lifted the commitment to shutdown the Chernobyl units by the end of 1993. Natalia Feduschsak,
Chernobyl Safety Fears Grow as Ukraine Reverses Decision to Shut Nuclear Plant, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 1994, at B5C. The IAEA estimated 25% of Ukraine's power in 1992 was from nuclear
plants. Nuclear Power Contributions in 1992, NUCLEAR NEWS, June 1993, at 53.
157. Safety Measures Needed for Chernobyl-Type Reactors, Reuters, Apr. 10, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
158. Mark Trevelyan, Western Experts to Test CIS Chernobyl-Type Plants, Reuters, Mar. 6,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
159. Id.; see also Upgrading E. Bloc Reactors Would Cost Bins-Expert, Reuters, Mar. 24,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (a Siemens AG expert estimated it would
cost some 14 billion marks (DM) to upgrade East European Reactors to western standards).
160. Simon Rippon, Comment from Europe: Just How Bad Are Those Early Reactors?, Nu-
CLEAR NEWS, Sept. 1991, at 74, 74.
161. Id.
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inherently safe than RBMK reactors, the lack of an integrated con-
tainment, segregated wiring, and adequate emergency makeup sys-
tems means they fall short of western standards for reactor safety.162
There are three broad areas to discuss: maintenance, broadcasting re-
quirements under an emergency plan, and continued operation of the
RBMK, which precede a description of the present state of reactor
safety and safety oversight.
1. Maintenance
A major concern with on-going safe operation of civilian nuclear
power plants is continuing maintenance. Critical to that maintenance
is a continuous supply of spare parts. Recall the lines for daily neces-
sities that were common to everyday life in the USSR; why should
access to critical parts for power plant operation be any different?
According to Dr. William Potter, director of Russian Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies, "[t]hey are not able to
provide even the former sloppy levels of maintenance and they can't
get spare parts, especially in the Ukraine."'163
2. Broadcasting Problems-the Emergency Plan
Public relations also appears to be a problem, although, in the
post-Chernobyl era, Russians are doing a better job of announcing
reactor malfunctions. Following a leak from an RBMK reactor at Sos-
novy Bor, the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy's head of informa-
tion made the following reassuring remarks: "[w]e are perfectly aware
of our shortcomings.... The quality of our construction is not good at
times, but it does not have anything to do with the design of reac-
tors."'164 The Sosnovy Bor incident was caused by water-supply valve
failure (feeding channels which were undergoing refueling), causing
local overheating of fuel, with a resulting escape of radioactive
162. Id. Considerations for what makes one reactor design more inherently safe than an-
other include factors such as reactor physics design, independently powered and housed safety
systems available to mitigate the consequence of an accident, the amount of operator involve-
ment required to prevent an accident (availability and capability of automatic systems), and the
number and sufficiency of barriers between the nuclear fuel and the public. Although there is no
absolute agreement among all nations as to what are minimum safety requirements, standards in
the above-listed areas have been applied in Europe, Japan and the United States.
163. Alan Eisner, Experts Say U.S. Ignored Soviet Reactor Safety, Reuters, Mar. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Dr. Potter has also noted that not only is parts
availability low, but repairs are being delayed due to a lack of funds to purchase additional parts.
Potter, supra note 5, at 65.
164. Janet Guttsman, Russia Will Keep Chernobyl-Style Reactors Running, Reuters, Mar. 26,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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gases.165 In contrast to the Chernobyl accident, this incident (a radio-
active leak to the atmosphere below hazardous levels) was quickly an-
nounced to the international community on the morning of its
occurrence.
166
The improved communications with the international community
and with their sister stations is reassuring, as the other stations can
now assess the likelihood of a similar failure, and if parts are available,
replace the defective water-supply valves at their plants. Added as-
surance of rapid notification of reactor incidents will come from a nu-
clear safety monitoring center being established in Finland to monitor
nuclear plants in the former Soviet states, providing information to
Germany, and all Nordic countries.
167
3. RBMK Reactors: Unsafe at any Speed?
Although the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") has
provided technical and logistical support to CIS republics to make im-
provements toward safe reactor operations, senior NRC officials may
not provide future support for RBMK reactors.' 68 It has been sug-
gested that NRC officials believe the fundamental design is unsafe,
and the NRC does not wish to be viewed as sanctioning their
operation. 69
The suggestion that RBMK reactors are inherently unsafe has
been challenged by Russian designers who claim that attempts to
shutdown the reactors are politically motivated. 70 Responding to
Ukrainian suggestions the reactors were unsafe, and therefore will be
shutdown next year, Yuri M. Cherkashov countered that if the reac-
tors were really unsafe, they should be shutdown immediately, not
next year. 171 However, conscious that there are some design flaws,
post-Chernobyl improvements have been made to RBMKs, including
165. Id.; Marshall Elliot, Western Leaders Disagree on Soviet Reactor Safety Plan, Scl., July
17, 1992, at 319.
166. Id.
167. Former Soviet Nuclear Stations to be Monitored from Finland, Reuters, Aug. 25, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
168. Ensuring Nuclear Safety in Russia, An International Concern, SURVIVING TOGETHER,
Spring 1992, at 21, 21.
169. Id.
170. E. Michael Blake, Advice from Outsiders on Soviet-Design Reactors, NUCLEAR NEWS,
Jan. 1993, at 71, 71.
171. Id. Cherkashov is with ENTEK, the Russian research and development institute of
power engineering.
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changes in operations and fuel loading procedures to increase the
margin of safety.
172
4. Initial Steps Toward Safe Reactors
To address international concern for its reactors, Russia has
stated a goal: to modernize its operating nuclear power plants, with
safety being the center focus of future nuclear energy development. 173
However, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy ("Minatom") has
been unclear about the sources of funding to meet the goals.174 Rus-
sians and Ukrainians have requested and received visits from interna-
tional assessment teams to assist them with safety assessments, plant
operations, and the drafting of new legislation for nuclear waste han-
dling. 175 Russia has also agreed to comply with the Vienna Conven-
tions on Early Notification and Assistance. 1
76
Ukraine has also started to upgrade their reactors, based on U.S.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70 and specific advice from IAEA opera-
tions review teams. 177 Initially, upgrades have been made to fire sup-
pression systems and instruments and controls used for monitoring
plant operations.
178
The IAEA has joined forces with the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme ("UNDP") to try to improve nuclear power plant
safety in all the former Soviet States. 179 After initial meetings were
held with representatives of the affected nations, the groups decided
individual national solutions were needed for regulatory void and
plant safety problems, because of the void left by the absence of the
central support agencies in the old USSR, despite the apparent dupli-
172. Id. at 72. Post-Chernobyl modifications to fuel loading and limitations on number of
control rods permitted to be withdrawn have assured core reactivity is less than 0.5, meaning the
control rods present can easily control the reactor. In Chernobyl unit 4, core reactivity was
greater than 2 when steam was present in the coolant channels.
173. Oleg Shchedrov, Russia Puts Safety First in Nuclear Energy Sector, Reuters, June 26,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
174. Id.
175. Letter from Citizen Ambassador Program, Nuclear Technology Delegation to Russia
and Ukraine, to Robert Temple (Mar. 25, 1993) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Letter].
176. See Peter Cameron, The Vienna Convention on Early Notification and Assistance, in
NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW AFTER CHERNOBYL 19, 19, 29-30 (Peter Cameron et al. eds.
1988)(where the USSR committed to the treaty and special immediate notification arrangements
were made with Finland). For more detail on these commitments, see ADEDE, supra note 112.
177. Blake, supra note 170, at 72. Regulatory Guide 1.70 covers the guidelines for safety
reporting. See generally OFFICE OF STANDARDS AND DEV., U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, REG-
ULATORY GUIDE 1.70: STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS FOR
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (LWR ed. 1978).
178. Id.
179. Morris Rosen, Strengthening Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Countries of the Former
USSR, IAEA BULL., Dec. 1993, at 34, 34-35.
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cation of effort that would result.180 Needs assessments, being per-
formed by the joint task force for each country, are in their
preliminary stages.181
5. Safety Oversight
The regulatory arms charged with assuring plant safety are having
difficulty fulfilling that mandate, with one cause suggested to be low
morale.' 82 Observers say low morale is caused by low pay for these
government jobs, resulting in many leaving for the private sector. For-
mer inspectors are often hired by the plants where they previously
worked, at a higher salary, creating an obvious conflict of interest.
83
In addition, some have expressed the concern that the governments
have placed a low priority on nuclear safety.
84
E. Nuclear Weapons
Although the weapons treaties are not central to this discussion,
nuclear weapons handling (since it is radioactive material) and the
waste created by weapons destruction or storage deserves considera-
tion. Four members of the CIS originally acknowledged they were
holding nuclear weapons: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan.185
Although Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had previously
agreed to send their weapons to Russia for destruction, Ukraine sus-
pended further shipments after sending fifty-seven percent of their ac-
knowledged tactical nuclear arsenal.' 86 Economic difficulties caused
180. Id. at 35.
181. Id.
182. Potter, supra note 5, at 65.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Vasily Kononenko, Outcome of Moscow Meeting of CIS Heads of State Inspires Moder-
ate Optimism, IZVESTIA, July 7, 1992, at 1-2, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 5,
1992, at 24, 24.
186. Ukraine Stops Sending Nuclear Arms to Russia, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 13,
1992, at lA. The agreement between Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan was called "Dec-
laration on Nuclear Arms," and was signed December 22, 1991. The parties committed to use
nuclear weapons for the collective security of the CIS, and established a joint decision-making
process for their use. The parties also committed not to be the first to use the weapons, and
finally agreed to withdraw the weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine by July 1, 1992
for disassembly in a central plant. Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for Economic Co-operation
and Dev., Commonwealth of Independent States: Declaration on Nuclear Arms, NUCLEAR L.
BULL., June 1992, at 102. Centralized control of nuclear weapons in the CIS, however, is
threatened because three republics, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Moldavia, of the original con-
sortium of ten have withdrawn support for the Russian-controlled plan. Mark Trevelyan, Three
CIS States Refuse to Sign New Charter, Press Ass'n, Jan. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File. The original agreement to rid Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan of nuclear
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Ukraine to tentatively agree to exchange the remaining weapons to
Russia for fuel for Ukrainian reactors, in an agreement also granting
Russia rights to the Black Sea Fleet in exchange for forgiveness of
part of Ukraine's debts to Russia.1s7 Both Russia and Kazakhstan
have indicated they are committed to meeting the limits of the
START treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (1991) originally
signed between the Soviet Union and the U.S.), which calls for nu-
clear non-proliferation and deep cuts in nuclear arsenals.188 Belarus,
meanwhile, has continued to adhere to their promise to rid themselves
of weapons. 8 9
Presently, Russia is having difficulty storing the weapons it has,
and it lacks sufficient capacity to store all the plutonium and highly
enriched uranium from weapons disassembly.' 9° Evidence of the diffi-
culty in managing materials storage in the reprocessing setting was
shown by the 1993 explosion and release from Tomsk. 19'
Officials from the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry and Russian
Academy of Sciences suggested that the material removed from the
weapons could be used to power commercial power plants, and that
the volume recovered would be sufficient to power the world's nuclear
power plants for twenty years.192 Some handling and reprocessing is
still required to transform weapons-grade material to the lower en-
richment fuel called for in commercial reactors.
weapons was signed in Lisbon, in May 1992. Ukraine: Ukraine Foreign Minister Criticizes Russia
on Arms, Reuters, Aug. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
187. Fuel-for-Arms Agreement Announced in September, NUCLEAR NEWS, Oct. 1993, at 47,
47. However, uncertainty exists for completion of weapons disposal, despite agreements, for two
reasons: first, because of Ukraine's change in position, and second, because of the reported lack
of safeguards controls for weapons material in the CIS. Primetime Live: Loose Nukes (ABC
television broadcast, Oct. 14, 1993). In January 1994, however, President Kravchuck signed an
agreement with President Clinton to accept $1 billion (U.S.) to destroy their nuclear weapons.
Matthew Campbell, Ukrainian Militants Prepare for a Nuclear Showdown, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Feb. 6, 1994, World News, at 14, 15.
188. 500,000 Kazakhs Said Affected by Nuclear Tests, Reuters, May 21, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. For tracking methods for weapons exchanges under START,
see generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES: MEASURES
FOR MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE START TREATY (1990).
189. Tim Zimmermann & Bruce B. Auster, Ukraine and the Bomb, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 9, 1993, at 44, 44.
190. Russia Plans to Build Plutonium Storage Unit, Reuters, Apr. 9, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
191. Steve Erlanger, Russian Officials Say Little Radiation Released in Nuclear Plant Acci-
dent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at A4. The explosion took place at a plutonium separation
facility. Id.
192. Russia Plans to Build Plutonium Storage Unit, supra note 190.
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Related to this, at least two reactors producing weapons-grade
plutonium have been shut down in recent months. 193 The plants, lo-
cated in Krasnoyarsk, will be sealed over during the next five years.
Research from these old reactors will be used to help inspectors per-
forming assessments at other older commercial reactors.
194
F. Scientific Uncertainty
Uncertainty exists for the nuclear waste problems on two
levels. 195 First, what is the extent of the problem: the fallout, the radi-
oactive material build-up, and the amount of contamination? Second,
what is the real health risk, given the contamination levels? The first
question presents a logistical nightmare-the need to quantitatively
assess a problem that has received spotty documentation. The second
question is one of interpretation given limited knowledge of actual
chronic exposure.
1. Extent of the Problem
The quantitative assessments of Chernobyl took over four years
to assemble, and research to determine the full extent of damage is
still in progress. 196 The extensive destruction and fallout crossing in-
ternational borders were factors which lent international attention
and expertise to assessing the results of Chernobyl. The after-effects
of Chernobyl are still not fully contained or understood. 197
There are several claims of more extensive problems hidden by
the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan was the site for fourteen years of
above-ground nuclear testing. 98 During this period, there was no
monitoring of the population or analysis of the ecological impact of
these tests. 199 In the Kazakh town of Shevchenko, renamed Aktas,
contamination levels from a uranium processing plant are said to be
193. Russia Shuts Down Plutonium-Producing Reactor, Reuters, Sept. 29, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
194. Id.; Russia Closes Oldest Military Reactor, Reuters, June 30, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File.
195. For applications of scientific uncertainty to law, see, RONALD BRICKMAN ET AL., CON-
TROLLING CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
187-217 (1985).
196. Economic and Social Consequences of Chernobyl, supra note 148.
197. See, e.g., Radiation Up After Fires in Chernobyl Area Agency, Reuters, Aug. 6, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (describing fires in southern Belarus causing an
increase in airborne radioactive dust, after a summer with little rain).
198. David Ljunggren, Kazakhstan City Battles Disastrous Pollution, Reuters, July 9, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; Former Soviet Nuclear Stations to be Monitored
from Finland, supra note 167.
199. Ljunggren, supra note 198.
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eighty times greater than acceptable levels.2°° Kazakhstan continues
having problems keeping up with new waste problems. Since Russia
has become reluctant to take nuclear waste from outside its borders,
spontaneous radioactive dumps have been turning up in the desert
areas of Kazakhstan.
201
Uranium mines of Magadan, northern Russia, were carved out by
Gulag workers between 1949 and 1954, and were left just as they were
abandoned.202 Although the locals fear radioactive contamination,
the area has reportedly not been surveyed.
20 3
Military complex records have not been opened for public screen-
ing, even though many military waste problems are on public lands.
204
At least four examples of military waste problems on public lands
have become public knowledge. Radioactive waste from a 1985 So-
viet submarine disaster was found buried near Vladivostok. 20 5 A
waste tank exploded in 1957 contaminating a large area of land near
Chelyabinsk. 20 6 Also near Chelyabinsk, the partial evaporation of a
lake used as a nuclear waste dumping area resulted in the permanent
evacuation of area residents in 1967.207 Finally, nuclear waste dumped
from the submarine works in Severodvinsk has been blamed by some
for doubling of two types of cancer deaths from 1985-1990.208
The Chernobyl site has received sufficient attention that the
IAEA has made a pronouncement about the limits of the long-term
effects of that accident.2°9 Chernobyl was a major international inci-
dent which received world-wide resources and attention. In contrast,
the same concern and resources have not been provided for the other
contaminated sites, severely limiting the ability to assess contamina-
tion levels or recommend reasonable protective measures to the
residents. 210
200. French TV Says Nuclear Waste Dumped in Moscow, Reuters, Aug. 19, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; see also Mike Edwards, A Broken Empire: Kazakhstan, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 1993, at 22, 23-36.
201. 0. Stefashin, Kazakhstan: Spontaneous Radioactive Dumps Begin to Appear, Reuter
Textline Novecon, Aug. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
202. James Flannery, A Helicopter Ride to a Gulag Hell Where Slaves Mined Uranium,
Reuters, May 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
203. Id.
204. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 147, at 170-75.
205. Id. at 173.
206. Id. at 174.
207. Id. at 175.
208. ld. at 174.
209. See generally INTERNATIONAL CHERNOBYL PROJECr, supra note 151.
210. See Zoltan Annau, Belarus: World Bank Environment Mission 3-4 (July 1992) (unpub-
lished second draft report). The U.S. Department of Energy is still in the discovery and planning




The second level of uncertainty is to what extent health risk exists
with the varying levels of exposures people have received. Interna-
tional limits for exposure of occupational radiation workers have been
lowered to two rems per year, while the limit set in the United States
is five rems per year.211
There are several opinions as to the threshold harmful exposure
limit for ionizing radiation. The study originally relied on for data was
of Japanese survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb explo-
sions.21 2 The application to chronic rather than acute radiation expo-
sure has been greatly questioned.213 Studies in the United States have
fueled intense debates as to whether the cause of death of radiation
workers was due to radiation or to other factors.214 It is difficult to get
analysts to agree on the proper statistical method to remove biasing
factors (such as cigarette smoking) from studies which purport to indi-
cate at what threshold workers experience an increase in cancer.
215
Until such biasing factors are isolated, it will be difficult to project the
amount of harm that will result to members of the public exposed to
uncontained waste.21 6
G. Economics
Both Russia and Kazakhstan have indicated they wish to expand
their civilian nuclear power programs. 21 7 However, neither country is
party to an international agreement establishing nuclear third-party
liability in the event of an accident, or has insurance to compensate
victims in the event of an accident.21 8 Other countries participating in
action plans to protect cleanup crews. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HAZARDS
AHEAD: MANAGING CLEANUP WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY AT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COMPLEX 2, 13 (1993).
211. Len Ackland, Radiation Risks Revisited, TECH. REV., Feb./Mar. 1993, at 56, 61. A new
revision of the guiding U.S. government limits is set to take effect in 1994, which adds new rules
for occupational exposure to radiation, per 10 C.F.R. § 20 (1993), assuring an integrated ac-
counting of all exposures the worker receives.
212. Id. The latest study of this group, labeled BEIR V, was considered the most complete
assembly of data on a group of exposed persons as it included a review of health records of over
41,000 exposed persons. Id. at 58.
213. Id. at 58-59.
214. Id. at 61.
215. Id.
216. See id. The radiation exposure risk debate is certainly secondary to identifying the sites,
and removing people from areas of known deadly exposure levels.
217. See Potter, supra note 5, at 61; Russia Closes Oldest Military Nuclear Reactor, Reuters,
June 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
218. See discussion of international treaties, like the Vienna Accord of 1988 or the Paris
Convention of 1960, supra notes 111-126 and accompanying text.
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insurance pools have had to meet international standards for reactor
safeguards, maintenance, and personnel training, to meet minimum
standards for insurability. Even though civil law imposes strict liabil-
ity for hazardous activities, 219 there are no assurances that victims will
be compensated for their losses, given the present economic state of
the independent republics.
Economic chaos is the present state of affairs in most of the CIS.
Inflation is spiraling out of control, with the Russian Ruble decliniLng
in value from about $0.008 U.S. in July 1992 to less than $0.001 in
October 1993.220 Shortages still exist in the marketplace, and what
can be produced cannot get distributed to the limited market that ex-
ists.221 This has had two significant effects on the scientific elite: either
causing them to leave the CIS, in search of higher salaries and stable
employment, or to become entrepreneurs and sell their skills in the
open market.222 Wages in some specialty areas have dropped to sub-
sistence levels. 223
This economic climate will not ensure that the best nuclear minds
remain in the CIS to help uncover and solve environmental and safety
issues. Further, there are concerns that some nuclear scientists are
being drawn to the highest bidders to apply their skills in such loca-
tions as Libya and North Korea. 224 The loss of trained specialists and
lack of spare parts has already become a safety concern, according to
the head of Russia's State Committee for Civil Defense and
Emergencies.225
The economic news is not all bad. As of December 1992, $375
million (U.S.) in nuclear aid has been sent to Eastern Europe from a
variety of sources, about two-thirds of which has come from the Euro-
pean Community.226 The EC has allocated an additional $560 million
in nuclear aid, with $100 million specifically to meet reactor safety
concerns. 227 The G-7 leaders have indicated an interest in funding re-
219. See, e.g., W.B. SIMONS, THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 387 (1980).
220. Mike Edwards, A Broken Empire: Russia, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 1993, at 4, 13;
Peter Galuszka et al., What Yeltsin Must Do, Bus. WK., Oct. 18, 1993, at 22, 23.
221. See Edwards, supra note 220, at 13-16.
222. Tim Beardsley, Trends in Russian Science: Selling to Survive, Sci. AM., Feb. 1993, at 92,
93-97.
223. Id.
224. Richard Saltus, Soviet Atom Experts Add to West's Worries, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12,
1992, at 1.
225. Ralph Boulton, Russia Alarmed by Loss of Nuclear Specialists, Reuters, Mar. 25, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.




actor safety upgrades and to help shut down those reactors which they
view as too dangerous to operate.228 Some cost estimates range from
$18 to $24 billion (U.S.) to take care of unsafe reactors in the CIS.229
Decommissioning older units and replacing generating capacity with
non-nuclear sources would cost $18 billion (U.S.), while $24 billion
(U.S.) is an estimate of upgrade costs to bring these plants up to west-
ern standards. 230
H. Regulatory Structure
The synopsis below discusses the four CIS countries that have an-
nounced specific nuclear or environmental programs (or plans for
such programs) relating to managing nuclear waste: Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus.23 1 Before the breakup of the USSR, the So-
viet and central regulatory agencies had established regulations which
are still available in the absence of new state action.
1. Russia232
Minatom is responsible for power production as well as adminis-
trative control of fuel materials. The ministry acts as both a safety
oversight arm (Gosatomnadzor) and as line management over day-to-
day plant operations (Rosenergoatom).233 Gosatomnadzor was ini-
tially established to operate outside of Minatom authority in order to
provide independent oversight of both civilian and military reactor
228. Russia wants to Close Nuclear Plants by 2005, Reuters, July 16, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. The group of G-7 includes the United States, Japan, Ger-
many, France, Britain, Canada, and Italy. Id From the latest round of G-7 talks, aid pledged to
Russia is reported to exceed $40 billion (U.S.), and Japan is pursuing the issue of Russian nu-
clear waste dumping at sea. G-7 to Set Up Russia Aid Office in Sept., supra note 125. G-7
pledges were $700 million (U.S.) toward reactor safety upgrades in the CIS as of July, 1993.
Victoria Pope & Julie Corwin, Radiation in Russia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 9, 1993, at
40, 41.
229. Eastern Europe's Nuclear Power, ECONOMIST, July 24, 1993, at 19, 21.
230. Id. Sources report that World Bank and the International Energy Agency support a
version of the former plan (gas-fired replacement of decommissioned nukes). Seth Shulman,
Risky Reactors, TECH. REV., Aug./Sept. 1993, at 18, 19.
231. Included in this list are the three countries with operating reactors and the fourth, Be-
larus, has a severe cleanup problem left over from Chernobyl, but is considering nuclear reactors
to meet its own electrical generating power needs.
232. According to the President of Rosenergoatom (the operator of Russia's electrical
generating nuclear power plants) Yevgeny Ignatenko, "We don't even have a law on nuclear
energy. It is currently being considered by the commissions of the Supreme Soviet." Yevgeny
Reshetnikov et al., Press Conference by the Atomic Ministry of RF (1) 15 January, Official
Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Jan. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
233. Russian Federation, supra note 7, at 59-60. See Clive Cookson, A Bittersweet Celebra-
tion-Clive Cookson Examines Russia's Nuclear Expansion Programme, as It Turns 40 Today,
FIN. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at 16; Ann MacLachlan, Cash-Strapped Minatom Holds on Anticipat-
ing Promised Relief, NUCLEONICS WK., June 16, 1994, at 11.
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programs in Russia.234 However, a recent presidential decree placed
control of Gosatomnadzor under Minatom.235 Although concern has
been expressed over the conflict of interest of having operations su-
pervision and safety oversight under the same organization, attempts
to legislate change have not yet been successful.
236
Gosatomnadzor has recently drafted new legislation on radioac-
tive waste handling, following materials from creation to burial.23
7
Part of the management plan included separation of Gosatomnadzor
from Minatom to remove control of nuclear safety and waste handling
from groups which have a poor track record of safety oversight.238 In
addition, future legislation would be designed to be compatible with
legislation from the Ministry of Ecology.239 This legislation was only
in the outline stages in early 1993, and passage in its present form is
considered unlikely.240 Thus, elements favoring single-agency control
of both reactor safety and power production seem to have the ear of
both President Yeltsin and other forces within the Supreme Soviet of
Russia.
As noted earlier, the effectiveness of safety oversight can be
called into question for reasons beyond the potential conflicts of inter-
est in reporting schemes. Site inspectors working for Gosatomnadzor
are poorly paid, with undersized staffs and internally confusing lines
of authority.241 Also, although laws have been proposed, no legisla-
tion governing nuclear safety has yet been passed.
242
Broad environmental laws that impact the continued expansion
of nuclear power exist in Russia. Presently, the law requires an envi-
ronmental impact statement to be filed prior to issuance of major con-
struction permits.243 A presidential decree was issued to waive such
234. LINDA LEHMAN, L. LEHMAN & Assoc., INC., RUSSIAN Low-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL
PROGRAM 5 (1992) (copy on file with author).
235. Id.
236. Id. The Russian nuclear utility Rosenergoatom reports to the chain which includes
Minatom, further confusing the separation of interests. See Selin Lists Measures of NRC Success
of Aid to Russia, INSIDE N.R.C., June 13, 1994, at 20, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.




241. Potter, supra note 5, at 65-66.
242. Id. at 66. A new atomic energy law, which was scheduled to be brought before parlia-
ment in January 1993, would require permission from local authorities to site any new nuclear
projects. Russia: More Detail on Effort to Resume Construction, supra note 5, at 79.
243. See, e.g., Valery Vyzhutovich, Private Capital Begins to Build Largest Port on the Baltic,
IZVESTIA, May 29, 1992, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, June 30, 1993, at 21.
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reports when construction is in either scarcely populated or poor areas
of Siberia.24
4
The Committee on the Rational Use of Natural Resources pro-
posed a new radiation safety law through its Subcommittee on Radia-
tion Safety.245 Presented to the Russian Supreme Soviet in September
1992, it has yet to be passed.
246
Other noteworthy organizations in the Russian nuclear scheme
include the Russian State Federal Committee for the Supervision of
the Safe Uses of Nuclear Energy, which provides both a technical and
safety oversight at nuclear power stations, and the State Sanitary Su-
pervision Committee, with the role of monitoring radiation releases to
the general public and assuring releases are within government limits
during normal and accident conditions.
247
Even if agencies are created and laws are passed, can they be
effective with a government under threat? Two coups have been at-
tempted during the democratization of Russia.248 Vladimir Zhirinov-
sky, a nationalist Russian leader, has suggested a third coup may be
pending. 249
2. Ukraine
Ukraine, as the site of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, quickly
passed laws related to the status and protection of land and people
affected by the accident.250 The Ministry of Environmental Protection
was established, and the Ukraine Soviet is working on a package of
legislation relating to protection of health of humans and protection
of the ecosystems. 25' An additional commission was created just to
track findings related to Chernobyl.252
244. Electronic Mail from C.E. Eli to Molly W. Lien (Sept. 11, 1993) (on file with author).
245. Potter, supra note 5, at 66 n.3.
246. Id.
247. This is according to the head of the Main (Energy) Directorate, Alexander Lapshin.
Reshetnikov et al., supra note 232.
248. In August 1991, hardline communists attempted a coup of then President Mikhail
Gorbachev. In October, 1993, hardliners, this time fighting economic reforms, tried to over-
throw President Boris Yeltsin. Russia: Chronology of Events Leading to Russia's Elections, Reu-
ter General News, Dec. 10, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
249. Ralph Boulton, Russia: Coup in the Offing? Of Course, Says Zhirinovshy, Reuter Gen-
eral News, Mar. 29, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
250. UKRAINE NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 12.
251. Id. at 36. In response to deteriorating environmental conditions, due to unchecked in-
dustrial output in Ukraine, the Ministry of Environmental Protection is drafting sweeping legis-
lation to establish minimum performance standards along with fines for violators. Daniel Gogek
& Mary Hartnett, Foreign Investment in Ukraine: New Laws, Opportunities and Issues, 27 INT'L
LAW. 189, 200 (1993).
252. Id.
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In the area of nuclear safety, the Ukraine has established the
State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (GANU). Ukraine
legislators are trying to draft regulations to cover the full scope of
nuclear operations and waste issues.253 As in Russia, the Ukrainians
have yet to successfully pass any reactor safety legislation into law. 254
A separate plant owners group local to Ukraine has been estab-
lished, called Ukratomenergoprom.255 It has oversight authority for
plant safety, emergency response, and plant supervisor training. 256
3. Kazakhstan
The Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency has discussed coordinat-
ing refueling activities with Russia's Minatom. 257 The Kazakh reactor
is a breeder reactor that creates plutonium during continued reactor
operation.258 To recover this plutonium, for other power plant or
weapons use, requires fuel reprocessing equipment the Kazakhs have
yet to acquire. The Atomic Energy Agency has extended the reactor
license to 2003.259 As of mid-1993, Kazakhstan also has failed to pass
any substantive reactor safety measures.
260
4. Belarus
Belarus has no operating reactors, but it has a nuclear waste
problem, largely attributed to the Chernobyl accident. 261 There is a
Commission dedicated to the Chernobyl disaster problems with the
same authority level as the Commission on Ecology and Rational Use
of Natural Resources. 262 Both agencies report directly to the
Supreme Soviet for the Republic of Belarus.263 The Commission on
Chernobyl has been acting as an information collection and monitor-
253. UKRAINE NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 36-38.
254. Potter, supra note 5, at 66. A law in draft form on "Utilization of Atomic Energy and
Radiation Protection" has been created by GANU, but not yet enacted by parliament. Id. at 66
n.3.
255. Potter, supra note 5, at 64; Letter, supra note 175.
256. Letter, supra note 175.
257. Potter, supra note 5, at 62.
258. World List of Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 4, at 47, 60.
259. Potter, supra note 5, at 62.
260. Id.
261. World List of Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 4. While they have no plants at present,
the Supreme Soviet Chairman is a nuclear physicist by education (Stanislav Shuskevich) who has
been holding talks, along with the vice president of the Belarussian Ecological Agency, on
whether to build new nuclear reactors in Belarus. Potter, supra note 5, at 62.
262. THE STATE COMM. FOR ECOLOGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUs, GOVERNMENTAL




ing agency thus far, while it continues to develop new ways of assess-
ing and dealing with the scope of the disaster. 264
I. Summary of the State of the Former Soviet Union
An extensive nuclear waste problem was created by the military-
industrial complex of the former Soviet Union. The problem, as it was
left, is a major threat to the health and welfare of the citizens of the
CIS, and poses a threat to world health, as much of the waste is un-
contained. The nuclear waste problem was created by indiscriminate
dumping, intentional bombing, and reactor accidents. It is further
complicated by the need to unwind the military industrial complex
and disarm new nuclear powers, while maintaining the components in
environmentally safe storage.
Reactor safety is also a concern. The problem is based on ques-
tionable design of older units, and from the present inability to safely
maintain all operating nuclear units. The latter is caused by low parts
availability and poor economic conditions, which begs the question: if
people are operating on the most basic survival levels, are the
reactors?
Although there appear to be changes in officials' attitudes and
increased concern expressed for reactor safety and public safety, there
is no assurance that an attitude change has reached the line operator.
In addition, old power reactors remain on line to meet power-hungry,
economically poor republics' needs, without needed safety upgrades.
The present emphasis from oversight officials appears to be placed on
maintaining generating capacity, rather than on assuring reactor
safety.
Scientific uncertainty manifests itself primarily in the inability to
quantify the problem. There are enough identified locations and well-
documented studies to say that waste and reactor safety problems are
significant, but prioritization is impossible without further quantifying
the problems. It is difficult to determine the extent of the health con-
cern which comes from identified and yet-to-be identified waste.
The problems, as extensive as they are, are receiving both inter-
nal and international concern and economic aid. But as a Bulgarian
nuclear official illustrated, even though the aid from a variety of inter-
264. See id. at 9-10.
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national agencies is appreciated, it can be overwhelming when the aid
and advice is coming from a number of sources at once.
265
IV. ELEMENTS OF A PROPOSED MODEL
A. The Need for a Central Authority
1. What are the lessons learned from Europe?
States voluntarily give up a degree of sovereignty for some com-
mon good, because the nations themselves see some greater benefit
from the coalition. Limits to the benefits are reached when a per-
ceived local interest becomes a higher economic priority than the
community goal; this is typically labeled a vital state interest.
The EC acting through Euratom shows that a coalition of nations
can have a synergistic effect in resource allocation, aids in creating a
framework for cooperation on emerging issues, and acts as a stabiliz-
ing influence for sister states where no legislation exists. Even where
the central authority lacks complete control, the partial submission to
that authority influences legislation and judicial decisions favoring
recognition of the rights and needs of neighboring states.
2. Faults with comparing the EC and the CIS
How can fledgling republics act like nations that have had stable
governments for decades? The EC states are used to the democratic
process, and to the give-and-take necessary to advance within an in-
ternational scheme.
The EC has tremendous financial resources, and an industrial
base with significant economic clout. The EC can afford to share re-
sources for problem solving, because they have resources to share.
The Baltic States in the CIS have significantly different priorities from
the old industrial states or the impoverished Muslim states as to pre-
vent shared priorities.266 Wealthier nations of the EC can also afford
to underwrite projects for all of Europe, for the additional margin of
safety it would bring to their own citizens.
265. Blake, supra note 170, at 71. Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Bulgarian Committee on
the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, made this concern clear by showing a figure of
a stone block with the names of several organizations stacked on the stone, including IAEA,
WANO, (discussed below) and Commission of the European Communities, the weight of which
had flattened a nuclear plant operator. Id.
266. See ALVIN TOFFLER & HEIDI TOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR: SURVIVAL AT THE
DAWN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 213-14 (1993).
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3. What can a central authority accomplish better with
International Agencies?
International resources are better geared to team with a central
authority for effective problem resolution. Agencies and funds are
available to assist nations willing to join in the cleanup. However, in-
ternational groups have limited resources, and it is difficult for them
to respond effectively to many voices with individual concerns. A cen-
tral authority would be more effective at organizing the support the
CIS actually needs.
A central authority can structure more specific solutions to meet
the needs of their members, rather than the general approach taken
by international agencies. A central authority can also be a focal
point for prioritizing international resources already being allocated
to the problems.
B. Dealing with the Full Scope of the Problem
To get the massive backing needed to resolve the extensive
problems described here will require countries to agree on solutions
that will yield measurable results in assuring reactor safety and nu-
clear waste cleanup. The ability to measure results allows establish-
ment of concrete goals. With extensive problems, dividing the
problems into discrete steps makes the insurmountable achievable.
International resource donors would respond positively to their back-
ing of efforts resulting in measurable achievements.
Achieving results requires not only political and technical solu-
tions, but a holistic approach to these problems to create change.267
Workers, supervisors and regulators must reject the old accepted
norms for "safe" operation. Worker and supervisor resocialization, an
adjustment of safety culture, must be part of the solution.268 To get
workers to follow procedures and respect rules, they must appreciate
the significance of the rules and desire to follow them. This necessi-
tates going to work on principal values of the people who are ex-
pected to work within the scope of the "new" rules,269 and this cannot
be accomplished effectively through sanctions alone.270
267. GEOFFREY DE 0. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW 44 (1988) (referring to what Thomas
Kuhn had termed a "paradigm shift").
268. See id. at 350-51; Geoffrey Stevens & Masaya Yasui, Nuclear Energy in the Soviet Union,
NEA NEWSL., Spring 1991, at 10, 13.
269. WALKER, supra note 267, at 351.
270. Id.
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Resocialization can be accomplished through training and ex-
change programs. Training must be provided to introduce new pro-
grams, and to tell people why they should stay within new guidelines.
What actually causes change is (1) for people to see a program that
works, then (2) for them to envision themselves performing the same
way as those in the successful program did.
271
For example, if plant operators see other operators working
within a different framework, who are happier, have an easier time
accomplishing their work, and are able to accomplish more, then it is
not hard to sell a new program. Thus the WANO exchange program
has an added benefit beyond the information exchange suggested ear-
lier.272 What remains is to create the atmosphere that will allow work-
ers to envision themselves in the new framework, and once again, a
central authority coordinating off-site exchanges and on-site training
from outside experts can help facilitate this.
1. Nuclear Waste
a. Identify the Extent of the Problem
Scientific uncertainty exists about the locations, quantity, and ex-
tent of the waste problem. So, the first stage will be identifying the
size and scope of the problem. The IAEA, the WHO and UNSCEAR
were all involved in assessing the impact of Chernobyl on Ukraine,
Belarus and Russia. These groups, working with local governments,
can also help identify and assess conditions at other known nuclear
waste sites.
b. Set Safety Standards
The present state of uncertainty does not prevent initial passage
of key safety or cleanup legislation necessary to assure minimally ac-
ceptable levels of safe operation. The Russians have shown they are
interested in assuring the rest of the world that they follow universal
safety standards.273 To garner international confidence in environ-
mental management throughout the CIS, all republics should pass na-
tional legislation which follows existing internationally accepted
271. A variation on this is: a change in seeing, the way a situation is perceived, is required to
change being, the way things are. STEPHEN R. COVEy, THE SEVEN HABITS OF EFFECTIVE PEO-
PLE 15-45 (1990).
272. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
273. Reshetnikov et al., supra note 232.
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standards for radioactive release and exposure limits. 274 The IAEA is
offering their assistance for republics interested in adopting con-
forming standards.
275
Local laws that agree with internationally accepted standards
show more commitment to protect health and safety than any
broader-based agreement. If laws follow internationally accepted
models, they are easily followed (and to some degree implemented)
by a central authority. 276 However, either local control of these laws
or local enforcement of centrally developed laws assures that violators
could be faced with enforceable penalties for violating those laws.
Laws designed to protect the health and safety of the public must have
teeth, and they must then be enforced as written.
c. Apply Resources to the Problems
The republics have few economic resources. Their greatest re-
source, people, is available as dismantling of the military-industrial
complex has displaced many knowledgeable weapons workers, scien-
tists and technicians.277 These people are already qualified to assess,
contain and decontaminate waste sites, or could easily be trained to
perform these tasks. Not only would this help with a needed cleanup
effort, it would reduce unemployment.
Funding for this type of effort could come from at least four
sources outside the countries themselves. First, other national govern-
ments could offer a debt-for-nature cleanup exchange, that is, to for-
give some international loan debt in exchange for measurable
containment and cleanup of radioactive waste areas. 278 Second, funds
could come from directing international aid resources, in part, toward
nuclear waste cleanup. As previously discussed, this is already in pro-
gress from the EC, the G-7, and individual countries.
274. Much legislation for the protection of the environment was written under the old Soviet
regime, but was not enforced. See MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, THE SPOILS OF PROGRESS: ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION 27 (1992).
275. See IAEA Aid to Former USSR for Radiation Protection, Europe Information Service,
Oct. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File.
276. There is no reason new laws cannot be more progressive than their in-place counter-
parts. Consider risk-based regulation, which means to set standards and therefore allocate re-
sources based on calculated public risk as a more efficient scheme than trying to meet some
impossible absolute, the uncertain standard of "safe." See American Nuclear Society, A Position
Statement of the American Nuclear Society: Risk-Based Regulation, ANS NEWS, Dec. 1993, at 1,
1.
277. See supra notes 217-30 and accompanying text.
278. See TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 137, at 100-01.
World Wildlife Fund, as an example of an NGO performing a debt-for-nature swap, was willing
to buy out national debt for environmental progress. Id.
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Third, several countries within the CIS have natural resources
and are bringing in outside assistance to develop those resources, a
primary example being the oil reserves held by Russia and Kazakh-
stan.279 Instead of just taking cash in exchange for oil development
and reserves, CIS republics could negotiate application of these com-
panies' expertise in waste cleanup as partial payment of royalties.
280
Fourth, the republics, either directly or through international relief or-
ganizations, could solicit donations to perform cleanup.
281
Centralized control of incoming funds for waste cleanup could
help direct distribution to where proven needs are the greatest. This
would be best accomplished if distribution of international funds were
apolitical, therefore from an outside organization, with prioritization
based on severity of the waste problem or the threat to humans.
Centralization would also standardize expectations for perform-
ance (in order to receive funds), and allow centralized data collection
for monitoring of cleanup progress. Finally, any funds distributed
should be done jointly with national programs within the republics.
International aid would then back a concerted local effort, which in
turn would help develop local attitudes that favor protecting the envi-
ronment from future waste contamination.
Funds are not the only resource that needs centralized distribu-
tion. Centralization is also needed for equitable application of other
resources to problems. Where voluntary organizations are available,
they need input and advice on the best use of their resources. 282
Awareness of resources means more effective, non-redundant applica-
tion of the next wave of assistance.
279. See More Upstream Ventures Advance in Former U.S.S.R., OIL & GAS J., Sept. 13, 1993,
at 27; Caspian Shelf Consortium, KAZAKHSTAN PETROLEUM REV. (Price Waterhouse World Pe-
troleum Industry Group, Houston, Tex.), July 1993, at 1; Texaco Signs First Russian Oil Deal,
Energy Daily, Mar. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, ENGDLY file; Ed Lane, U.S.
Firms Call for Reform in Soviet Oil Sector, Energy Daily, Jan. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Energy Library, ENGDLY File; Occidental Begins Siberian Oil Exports, Energy Daily, Nov. 2,
1992, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, ENGDLY File.
280. Exxon's expertise, for example, is not limited to hydrocarbon cleanup as they were in
the nuclear fuels business until 1986. Daniel Shaw, Local Companies Gain Piece of Growing
Nuclear Market, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Dec. 16, 1991, § 1, at 10.
281. The CIS is not without assistance in soliciting donations, for visitors returning from the
CIS have beat them to this. The chairman of WANO, Lord Marshall, following his visit to CIS
reactor sites, suggested that members donate fire retardant paint, ultrasonic inspection equip-
ment (for RBMK pressure tube inspection), and instruments that integrate controls to sister
plants in the CIS. E. Michael Blake, Stopping By on the Way Home, NUCLEAR NEWS, June 1993,
at 74, 74.
282. A commendable effort comes from EC use of resident teams for on-site safety assist-
ance at power plants in Russia and Ukraine. EC Experts Begin Safety Residencies at Power




During a recent conference workshop on improvements needed
for Soviet-designed reactors, conducted during an American Nuclear
Society/European Nuclear Society joint meeting, the attendees agreed
on several priorities for reactor upgrade. 283 These include: (1) the
need to perform probabilistic risk assessments to determine the likeli-
hood of certain accidents, and steps which can be taken to further
reduce the potential for accident occurrence; 284 (2) containments need
to be created or improved for RBMK-style reactors and older VVER
reactors;285 (3) operator training needs to be improved, and site-spe-
cific simulators are needed to allow operators to practice preventing
or mitigating accidents;286 (4) fire detection and suppression systems
need to be upgraded;287 and (5) create supra-national RBMK and
VVER owners groups to better share problems and solutions.
288
International groups provide several methods for sharing stan-
dards and expectations which are norms for safe reactor operation.
International agreements and standards for reactor safety must be en-
forced within the CIS in order to assure an adequate margin of safety
for continued reactor operation and to safeguard nuclear materials
from terrorists.289 These requirements could be conditions on any
provision of funds. Also, compliance with international agreements
283. Blake, supra note 170, at 72-73.
284. It is difficult to recommend solutions without better definition of the problem. A prob-
abilistic risk/safety assessment would better help pinpoint the weaknesses in design and opera-
tions, and then specific solutions could be addressed to the areas of weakness.
285. Containments in these reactors vary from warehouse enclosures (non-existent) to some
stronger structures (bubble-type capable of absorbing the energy from small loss-of-coolant acci-
dents in older VVER plants). An immediate solution includes lining up ventilation to create a
negative pressure on existing structures, to minimize potential for spread of small radiation re-
leases. Blake, supra note 170, at 73.
286. Id. Training is also key to developing a culture that promotes safe reactor operations.
Presently that culture is underdeveloped as demonstrated by (1) the poor reactor siting to date
(most Soviet-built reactors are located within 10 kilometers of a tectonic fault); (2) poor plant
construction; (3) failure to follow established operating procedures; and (4) a lack of prevention
and defensive measures in the event of a casualty. Potter, supra note 5, at 65.
287. Blake, supra note 170, at 73. This includes shielding electrical cables (for fire protection
and to minimize interference with sensitive monitoring) and replacement of combustible plant
roofs.
288. Id. In the United States, owners groups include the reactor manufacturers (e.g. General
Electric, Westinghouse), the utility-operators, and vendors. These groups monitor plant compo-
nent malfunctions and share concerns, resources and solutions. This allows early identification
of failures at one plant to be shared with others, so, following notification by the owners group,
preemptive corrective actions can be taken at all plants of like design.
289. Presently, although security in both Ukraine and Kazakhstan is not up to IAEA safe-
guards standards levels of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT"), Russia is continuing to
ship fuel to these sites, in violation of its NPT agreement. Potter, supra note 5, at 66.
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could include agreements to meet international standards on third-
party liability.
290
According to international reports funds have started to pour in,
yet, in 1993, one Russian official claimed they have not seen one ko-
peck.291 The G-7 nations have committed to make contributions for
reactor safety upgrades; this effort is expected to need a minimum of
$700 million (U.S.), and the new money will join funds already con-
tributed primarily by EC member nations. 292 Already there are plans
to coordinate the expenditure of these funds, primarily on western
products and services which can be used to upgrade the CIS plants.
293
There is no agreement in place with the CIS as to what it is willing to
upgrade, or what it believes needs to be done to make its plants safe.
Some officials in the CIS believe their reactors are already safe.
294
Therefore, coordination of funds disbursement needs to occur
both to minimize redundancy and to assure prudent expenditures.
295
For maximum benefit, agreed-upon goals need to be set for expendi-
tures. Probably the best group to establish the needs side of this equa-
tion is a regional group of CIS reactor representatives working with
IAEA and NGOs to perform risk assessments, then set common
safety standards.
C. To What Degree Must Sovereignty be Sacrificed?
Is there any such thing as sovereignty with international environ-
mental or safety issues? Yes, as the state has the ultimate power and
burden to prevent pollution.296 But the question here is how to get
central control of reactor safety and nuclear waste to work. Complete
subrogation in these areas is unlikely, as states resist sacrificing their
physical or political integrity to outside forces.297 Some CIS republics
believe that allowing any supra-national control is a step back toward
290. The more operators understand continued operation is only permitted if they adhere to
high standards, the more likely they are to strive to exceed those minimum standards. Also,
operators must know they are economically tied to any failure to operate safely.
291. See supra note 265 and accompanying text; Reshetnikov et al., supra note 232.
292. Marlise Simons, Major Powers Back a Fund For Soviet-Design Reactors, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1993, at A2.
293. Id.
294. Reactor Upgrade Loans in Spring?, NUCLEAR NEWS, Mar. 1993, at 74, 74-75.
295. Centralized control of incoming funds is already in progress. See Simons, supra note
292, at A2. However, the effort thus far does not show enough has been done to get buy-in by
CIS personnel for the western concerns. As part of the holistic solution, more must be done
than the technological fix.
296. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 137, at 15.
297. Id. at 82.
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the old Soviet Union.298 The mood in some republics favors further
decentralization, increasing local autonomy.
299
Starting with international proposals: they could be forced on the
money-hungry republics. Trade sanctions are one way to impose solu-
tions, and the likely response would be the republics eventually sign-
ing on to some kind of agreement to avoid the sanctions.300 Money
could be thrown at the problems without asking for buy-in. They
might also be bribed to accept agreements,301 but coerced agreements
may not create lasting, substantive change.30 2 Will countries which
are still in a state of economic chaos be able to make any substantive
guarantees? 30 3 Despite the political and economic upheaval, these
countries still maintain enough structure to keep a power grid and
several reactors operating, so the present level of chaos is not an in-
surmountable block to a solution.
1. Ownership is the Key to Effective Problem-solving
International proposals that will help improve the CIS condition
should be voluntarily entered into, and the agreements should be
structured to support mutual interests, similar to the Early Notifica-
tion agreements. They can include economic incentives, but not coer-
cive incentives. They should be built jointly, not imposed unilaterally,
for lasting effect. No matter the assistance offered or controls pro-
posed, if the states are party to and promote the solutions as their
own, they have a chance at success.
298. Vitaly Portnikov, Yeltsin Won't Be Meeting with Kravchuck, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA,
Dec. 24, 1992, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POsT-SovIET PRESS, Jan. 20, 1993, at 22; The
President of Moldova on his Attitude Toward the CIS, IZVESTIA, Dec. 8, 1992, at 1, reprinted in
CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 6, 1993, at 24. For example, central control over mone-
tary policy in the EC has met resistance because, some feel, once the money comes under one
control, central political control will soon follow. Pieter V. Van Themaat, Some Preliminary Ob-
servations on the Intergovernmental Conferences: The Relations Between the Concepts of a Com-
mon Market, a Monetary Union, an Economic Union, a Political Union and Sovereignty, 28
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 291, 300 (1991).
299. Regionalism: What Does It Mean for Reform?, CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan.
27, 1993, at 9 (finding the political mood in Russia was swinging toward giving regional policy a
much larger role in political control).
300. See TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 137, at 65 (discuss-
ing trade sanctions as an incentive that may not work to enforce the Montreal Protocol).
301. Id.
302. For example, was North Korea's participation in the NPT merely momentarily politi-
cally advantageous? It was suspected North Korea signed onto the IAEA accord in January
1992, to temporarily bow to Japanese requirements for trade normalization, rather than because
of any substantive policy change. See Janet Snyder, Japan, North Korea Far Apart on Normaliza-
tion, Reuters, Jan. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
303. It has been asserted that the rule of law does not apply to impoverished nations or
nations with significant health problems. WALKER, supra note 267, at 336.
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What if a state won't voluntarily participate? It depends on the
level of non-compliance within the hold-out state because one pur-
pose of the central authority is to disseminate guidelines for what is
safe (and the concern is a non-participant would be non-compliant).
Some environmentally egregious acts can rise to the point where they
would be considered crimes against humanity, in which case they are
violations of international peremptory norms.3°4 However, the inter-
national community and states have relied on national law, and not
international law to enforce those norms.
305
Does non-participation of any single State prevent operation of
the central authority? No, it would just force the international com-
munity to deal piecemeal with that State. No state can afford to be-
come an isolated non-participant in light of the shared benefits.
Therefore, the individual benefit derived from a central agency must
outweigh the independent state approach to regulation and oversight.
2. What the CIS Atomic Energy Agency Can Accomplish
Does a centralized supra-national solution meet all the needs for
CIS countries to cure problems with nuclear waste cleanup and reac-
tor safety? No, but it does offer several advantages. As we have seen,
central oversight groups help channel resources for distribution.
30 6
Second, centralized coordination of some of the work and resources
would be more cost-effective than each nation creating the support
network needed for safety and cleanup oversight.307 Third, centraliza-
tion assures shared solutions for common problems.
Regional solutions administered by a central authority can often
provide better focus, understanding and results for unique regional
problems.30 8 Also, if implementation and enforcement is on a re-
gional level for problems with a regional character, as with the EC, it
is possible to get compliance. 309 The key to success of a regional
304. See LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 301 (1988). Peremptory norms are accepted by the international community as a whole as
the norm of general international law, often derived from existing law or custom, that cannot be
modified without some new norm replacing the old one, and if violated, since they protect the
overriding interests of all States, they are superior to individual national interests. Id. at 207-82.
305. Id. at 301.
306. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 137, at 75-76.
307. See id. at 76.
308. See id. at 118-20 (discussing the lack of IGO success on a state and international level,
but having success in a regional framework).
309. See id. Even where the central authority is not granted absolute power, as with the EC,




supra-national authority is agreement among all the nations to meet
desired goals. Such agreement can be made by recognizing that
greater benefits can be achieved through a central authority.
CONCLUSION
Central regional control would be effective in creating safety
standards, acting as a sharing resource for CIS nuclear operators, co-
ordinating cleanup efforts, and recommending local legislation. If the
central authority is a sharing center not dominated by a single power,
but a group working toward a common goal, it can overcome the
resistance to the old central Soviet.
Changes that must be made need to occur at all levels, from top
state regulators to field operators in plants, to assure that a holistic,
long-lasting solution is achieved. A central authority can provide the
continuity and direction needed to facilitate effective oversight of re-
actor safety and lasting solutions for nuclear waste cleanup problems
in the CIS.
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